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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, patent offices around the world have faced a progressive increase in 
patent filings, which has led to backlogs: ever-growing stocks of applications with 
longer examination pendency, a situation that supposedly generates uncertainty in the 
market. This general trend led the largest patent offices to enter into collaborative 
projects, with the objective of building a framework for an international mutual-
recognition system. The most desirable outcome would be that the work performed by 
one patent office would not be duplicated by other patent offices, thus saving time and 
resources. This global convergence process could be welcome, because it is expected to 
improve the efficiency of the patent systems in the most developed economies.
1  
 
However, although all large economic areas show evidence of an inflationary trend, 
there are noticeable differences across countries. The situation is more dramatic in the 
United States than in Europe or Japan. The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
faces a record number of yearly patent applications and the most impressive backlog. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum is the European Patent Office (EPO), which has the 
smallest backlog and the lowest number of filings. The Japan Patent Office (JPO) is in 
an intermediate position. In their in-depth investigation of the US patent system, Jaffe 
and Lerner (2004) raise the hypothesis of a vicious cycle in which a low-quality 
examination process leads to the filing of more low-quality applications, which in turn 
 
↑  Early drafts of this paper were presented at the IIR Innovation Forum seminar (Hitotsubashi 
University, Institute of Innovation Research, 5 February 2010, Tokyo), the EPO internal seminar 
(organized by SUEPO, 18 March 2010, The Hague), the BDI Conference (Bundesverband des 
Deutschen Industries, 'Tag des geistigen Eigentums', enforcement and quality in patent systems, 26 
April 2010, Berlin), the STRIKE/COST Competition and Innovation Summer School (CISS, 20 May 
2010, Turunç/Marmaris, Turkey), the Research Seminar of the Graduate School of Management (St. 
Petersburg State University, 25 May 2010, Russia), the IPTS Workshop on patent statistics (27 May 
2010, Seville), and the WIPO International Seminar (16 June 2010, Geneva). Challenging discussions 
took place during these events, and I would like to thank the participants for their constructive 
remarks, which contributed to improving this paper. In particular, Dirk Czarnitzki, Jérôme Danguy, 
Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Bronwyn Hall, Malwina Mejer and Niels Stevnsborg provided helpful 
suggestions. 
1  Since 2008, the USPTO has signed many Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) agreements with Japan, 
the UK, the EPO and other patent offices, offices that have also entered into other bilateral 
agreements. These agreements essentially aim to establish work-sharing and mutual recognition 
among patent offices. Under the PPHs, each patent office agrees to exploit the work previously done 
by other patent offices and to fast-track the examination of the corresponding patents. 2 
 
                                                           
further reduces the examination quality because examiners become overloaded. This 
'vicious cycle' hypothesis might also help explain the observed structural differences 
among the three major patent offices: different patent system designs might lead to 
different outcomes in terms of backlog and patent propensity. In order to validate this 
hypothesis, internationally comparable indicators of quality must be created.  
 
This paper develops a new methodological framework for assessing quality in patent 
systems. The research intention is to identify the extent to which patent systems differ in 
the 'delivery' or 'quality' of patent examination services. Quality is defined as the extent 
to which a patent system complies with its legal standards in a transparent way. Patent 
systems are characterised on the basis of a two-layer analytical framework. The first 
layer is composed of 'legal standards', and includes the selection of patentable subject 
matter, the novelty condition, the required degree of inventiveness and the fee schedule. 
Two legal standards – fees and the definition of patentable subject matter – are 
measurable and can be compared across countries. However, most countries have 
similar 'novelty' and 'inventiveness' conditions, so that differences can only be observed 
in the implementation of these two legal standards. Therefore, the second layer 
encompasses the 'operational design' put in place to ensure compliance with each legal 
standard. Operational designs include several elements that shape the rigour and 
transparency of the examination processes. The extent to which operational designs 
differ across countries may ultimately lead to different degrees of rigour and 
transparency in patent selection processes.  
 
The present paper contributes to the bridging of two important gaps through its 
objective and methodology. First, quality has not been investigated in the economic 
literature devoted to the analysis of patent systems. Several dimensions of patent 
systems have been thoroughly investigated, but quality as a whole has not been tackled. 
In contrast to much of the existing literature on patent systems, this paper is not about 
whether a specific dimension of a patent system’s design is good or bad for an 
economy. Rather, it focuses on assessing the extent to which quality varies across 
countries. Second, the paper helps to bridge the gap between the complex world of 
patent professionals (examiners, attorneys and experts) and the world of policy makers, 
research scholars and potential users. Patent systems are complex because they are 
located at an interface of legal constraints, economic incentives, scientific and 
technological advances, and business strategy.
2 At the extreme opposite is the 
economists’ routine that consists in overly simplifying the examination practice under 
abstract concepts such as patent 'breadth' or 'scope', which are nearly impossible for 
examiners to implement in practice. By identifying important elements of the 
operational design of two key legal standards, the paper achieves a fair balance between 
complexity and abstract simplification. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the research motivation, 
namely the extent to which backlogs occur, and it identifies potential causes and 
consequences of such backlogs. Section 3 summarises the economic literature on patent 
 
2  See, for instance, 'Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office', published by the 
European Patent Office (2010), which contains nearly 600 pages of laws, rules, practices and 
exceptions. 3 
 
                                                           
systems, while Section 4 presents the two-layer analytical framework: the legal 
standards and the components of their operational design. Section 5 compares three 
offices – the USPTO, the JPO and the EPO – on the basis of the analytical framework. 
Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section 6. The results provide 
evidence that quality varies to a significant extent across the three patent offices. 
 
 
2. Research motivation: common trends and structural differences 
 
Patent systems around the world are experiencing a constant increase in the number and 
size of patent applications. At the EPO, 2008 brought a record-breaking number of 
patent filings – about 226,000, which was an increase of more than 60 percent from 
2000. Figure 1 shows that this is far from an isolated occurrence; patent filings have 
been increasing in many countries in recent decades. This general trend may be 
attributable to several factors (see Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007): 
 
•  Higher levels of research and development (R&D) expenditures, fast-emerging 
technological fields (eg, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies) and fast-growing 
countries. Annual R&D expenditure in the OECD region increased from less than 
US$ 300 billion in the early 1980s to more than US$ 750 billion in 2008 (in 
constant 2000 PPP). If countries such as China, Russia, Israel and Singapore are 
included, the figure rises by another US$ 150 billion (compared to US$ 50 billion 
in 2000). 
 
•  The globalisation trend increases the propensity to file patents abroad, as 
demonstrated by the fast growth of PCT applications at WIPO. Danguy et al (2010) 
provide empirical evidence that the sharp increase in applications submitted to 
regional patent offices (especially the USPTO and the EPO) is essentially the result 
of a more pronounced globalization factor. In other words, a larger share of 
domestic priority filings is being transferred to foreign patent offices as second 
filings. 
 
•  New types of institutions are entering the patent arena, such as universities and 
young innovative companies. For example, academic patent applications now 
represent more than four percent of total applications, compared to less than 0.5 
percent in the early 1980s.
3 
 
 
 
 
 
3  The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave US universities more incentives to commercialize technology: “The 
act allowed universities to patent the results of federally-funded research and license the resulting 
technology to businesses and other entities” (Joint Economic Committee US Congress, 1999, p31). 
European countries and Japan adopted similar legislation during the 1990s. See, for instance, Geuna 
and Nesta (2007) and Lissoni et al (2008) for recent empirical evidence for European countries. 
According to Mowery and Sampat (2004), this trend is also evident in applications filed at the 
USPTO. Figure 1: Evolution of patent applications in three major patent offices 
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Source: Own calculations from annual reports of the three patent offices. Applications at the EPO include 
EPO-direct applications and PCT international applications for which search reports must be performed. 
 
•  New innovation management practices and patenting strategies are being developed 
by the business sector. Institutions are not only more likely to seek protection for an 
invention, they are also protecting those inventions with more than one patent. The 
patent-to-researcher ratio in the OECD region has more than tripled with EPO 
patents, from 1.6 patents per 100 researchers in 1980 to more than five patents per 
100 researchers in 2008. At the USPTO, the ratio was much higher than in the 
1980s; it has jumped from about six patents per 100 researchers 30 years ago to 
more than 10 today.
4 New management practices have also improved the 
productivity of research, which translates into more patent applications per R&D 
expenditure. These practices are characterised by a new division of labour, whereby 
some firms specialise in research activities and sell their research output to 
'producing' firms. According to Kortum and Lerner (1999), the observed jump in 
patenting in the 1990s reflects an increase in US innovation spurred by 
improvements in R&D management practices.
5 Companies are also changing their 
patent management style from a single-patent approach to a portfolio approach, 
which is based more on quantity than quality. This practice may be attributable to 
tactics and motivations that are designed to reserve or capture markets for 
                                                            
4  Own calculations, based on patent series statistics and R&D expenses (OECD, MSTI, 2008). 
4 
 
5  A more recent trend in innovation management is the 'open-innovation' process (see Chesbrough, 
2003) through which firms collaborate with other specialised firms on innovative projects in order to 
widen the scope of their knowledge base, and to speed up their development and market reach. For a 
firm to opening its own knowledge base to others generally requires sound protection of its own 
intangible assets, which partly explains the need to rely more frequently on the patent system. For 
instance, Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) show that three key dimensions of innovation strategy 
influence the size of a firm’s patent portfolio: the relative importance of basic and applied research in 
total R&D activities, the product or process orientation of innovation efforts, and the extent to which 
firms enter into collaborative R&D with other institutions. As the propensity to enter into 
collaborative R&D increases, there is a greater need for patent protection. 5 
 
technology, as described in Arora et al (2002), Guellec et al (2007) and de 
Rassenfosse (2010). 
 
The upward trend that characterises the three offices fails to highlight the important 
structural differences. The EPO, which processes applications for a region with nearly 
600 million inhabitants consistently receives less than half as many applications as the 
USPTO (with more than 440,000 applications a year since 2006). Furthermore, the high 
number of patents filed at the JPO fails to indicate that the number of claims it must 
address is much lower than the number addressed by the USPTO (JPO: average of one 
claim per patent in the early 1980s compared to nine today; USPTO: average of 24 
claims per patent). In other words, if the number of claims rather than the number of 
patents is taken into account, the JPO is much closer to the EPO than to the USPTO.  
 
Two factors may explain these structural differences across patent offices: cost and 
quality. The cost of patenting is based on several fees (including filing, search and 
examination fees; see van Pottelsberghe and François, 2009) and service costs 
(including searches for prior art, drafting or representation services; see van 
Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2010). If total fees are low, one would expect higher demand 
for patents, assuming that the demand for patents reacts to fees and costs. The empirical 
survey by de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2010) suggests that the fee elasticity 
of the demand for patent fluctuates by around -0.3. A 10 percent increase in fees would 
induce a three percent decline in the number of applications. As the cost per claim per 
million inhabitants is at least five times higher in Europe than in the US, one would 
expect higher demand in the US, but this probably does not explain the entire demand 
difference illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
An additional factor is related to quality: the ease of obtaining a patent should affect 
demand for patents. This 'laxity of patent offices' hypothesis has been raised by several 
scholars. Encaoua et al (2006, p1430), for instance, argue that the “boom in patent 
applications [is concomitant with] a general sentiment of relaxation of patentability 
requirements [...] in certain jurisdictions”. This argument is echoed in Gallini (2002), 
Sanyal and Jaffe (2006), and Bessen and Meurer (2008), who suggest that the increase 
in patenting in the US can partly be attributed to lower examination standards at the 
USPTO. 
 
The progressive increase in the number of patent filings and in their size (see 
Archontopoulos et al, 2007) has led to growing backlogs in the form of ever-increasing 
stocks of pending applications. In theory, these backlogs are detrimental to the economy 
because they are associated with a longer period of economic and legal uncertainty. In 
other words, entrepreneurs face increasing monopolistic rights, which constitute 
potential threats to their businesses venture. In this respect, one might wonder about the 
extent to which backlogs differ across patent offices. Three measures are put forward 
and discussed for the EPO, USPTO and JPO in van Pottelsberghe (2009): the number of 
pending applications (for which examination is requested), the number of pending 
claims, and the number of working months required to process the entire stock of 
pending applications. The three measures show that Europe’s backlog is similar to the 6 
 
                                                           
level of the US backlog in the mid-1990s, a period during which it was not an issue in 
the US. Japan is systematically in an intermediate position.  
 
A fourth indicator – the average pendency or examination time in each office – can be 
used to approximate the depth of the backlog issue. Increased pendency is the main 
factor used by patent offices to highlight the negative effect of backlogs. The trends 
depicted in Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2010) actually have different trajectories: 
pendency has substantially increased at the USPTO over the past nine years (from 25 
months in 2000 to 35 months in 2009); it has increased slightly at the JPO (from 30 
months in 2000 to 32 months in 2008); and it has actually decreased at the EPO (from 
51 months in 2001 to 43 months in 2008), although it is still substantially higher at the 
EPO than elsewhere.
6  
 
The backlog issue is intensifying in most patent offices. One side effect of this trend is 
its association with a decline in the average economic value of the filed applications. 
This is, for instance, evident in indicators based on the geographical scope of protection 
and duration of renewals in Europe (see, for example, van Pottelsberghe and van 
Zeebroeck, 2008, or van Zeebroeck, 2010). However, the trend does not reveal the 
fundamental structural differences observed across patent offices. The backlog is 
essentially a problem in the US, while it is less of an issue in Japan and definitely much 
less worrying in Europe. 
 
This paper focuses on structural differences among large patent offices. Identification of 
the roots of these international differences (such as a large demand for patents at the 
USPTO compared to a small demand at the EPO) might serve to highlight potential 
solutions. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for the idea that the drastic 
workload disparity between the EPO and the USPTO may be the result of quality and 
cost differences. In the US, for example, lower quality of the examination process and 
lower costs for patents could lead to a much higher propensity to file patents, which in 
turn could further reduce the quality of the examination process. This vicious cycle was 
highlighted by Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for the US, and by Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe (2007) for Europe. It is theoretically illustrated by Caillaud and Duchêne 
(2009): if more low-quality patents are filed, fewer resources can be devoted to their 
examination, which makes it easier to have a patent granted. However, formal 
assessments of the quality of patent systems have only been partially undertaken in the 
economic literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  The fact that pendency is much h i g h e r  i n  E u r o p e  i s  s o m e w h a t  endogenous. It reflects different 
processes (applicants have six months to reply to a written communication from the examiner) and 
voluntary drafting styles that aim at delaying the grant date. This desire to delay is motivated by the 
sharp increase in patent costs that occur once the patent is granted by the EPO (see Mejer and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2010). 7 
 
                                                           
3. The definition gap  
 
When stronger means weaker 
 
Scholars who analyse the effectiveness of patent systems generally focus on one or two 
facets of the system: patentable subject matters, duration, the inventive step (or its 
scope), geographical scope, or a combination of these. Most scientific contributions 
investigate the economic consequences of these four broad features. Four types of 
economic impact are generally considered (see eg, Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; 
Gallini, 2002; Encaoua et al, 2006; or Guellec, 2007).  
 
1)  Does the patent system lead to more invention?  
2)  Does the patent system stimulate more innovation?  
3)  Does the patent system encourage more disclosure of new knowledge?  
4)  Does the patent system facilitate technology transfer and the creation of markets for 
technology?  
 
Most scholars implicitly or explicitly rely on a notion of the 'strength' of patent systems 
and analyse the degree to which patent systems, contribute to achieving the ultimate 
goal of stimulating innovation and diffusing new knowledge. 
 
Early theoretical investigations into the role of patent systems originated with Barzel 
(1968), Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972), who argued that stronger patent systems 
would induce more investment in research and development. Following these early 
theoretical investigations, most landmark papers have essentially focused on three major 
aspects of policy making: the optimal length, the optimal breadth (or the optimal 
combination of these two dimensions), and the optimal geographical scope of 
protection. For instance, Gallini (1992) analyses the optimal length of a patent as a 
function of imitation costs. Klemperer (1990) examines the optimal scope of protection, 
whereas Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) identify the optimal mix between length and 
breadth of patents. Scotchmer (1991) and O’Donoghue (1998) explore how patent scope 
may affect the speed of generation and diffusion of new knowledge in a context of 
cumulative innovation processes. Patent protection that is too strong could lead to 
socially inefficient monopoly pricing and might stifle second-stage R&D. On the other 
hand, a small inventive step leads to 'hold-up' problems, whereby a patent granted for a 
small increment would actually provide more power to the second inventor.
7 The 
optimal patent policy should, therefore, balance the research incentives among 
subsequent generations of inventors. Scherer (2002) shows that whether stronger 
protection (where 'stronger' is defined as having a larger geographical scope or stronger 
enforcement mechanisms) stimulates further innovation depends on the degree of 
research competition in a given technological field. The more competition in the 
research arena, the lower the expected impact of a stronger patent system.  
 
The results of empirical studies generally lead to the conclusion that 'strong' patent 
systems have, at most, an ambiguous relationship with the rate of innovation and the 
 
7  See Chang (1995), Denicolò (2000), and Denicolò and Zanchettin (2002) for a theoretical analysis of 
optimal patent policies under cumulative innovation processes. 8 
 
                                                           
degree of information disclosure. However, the results show that they do facilitate 
technology transfer, sometimes at the cost of anticompetitive behaviour. In this 
literature, the 'stronger' terminology is not typically used to echo the degree of quality in 
the selection process (or its rigour), but rather to reflect its enforcement potential or 
'leading breadth' (future inventions might infringe on the patented invention). A 
common practice is to qualify a patent system as strong (or stronger) when more 
domains are patentable (ie, business methods, software or therapeutic methods, as 
suggested by Gallini, 2002), when the term of protection is lengthened (see Grossman 
and Lai, 2004), when the geographical scope is enlarged (see Scherer, 2002) or when 
patent holders receive more power in lawsuits (see Lerner, 2002). 
 
The indices of 'patent rights', which have been presented by Ginarte and Park (1997) for 
110 countries from 1960-1990, and by Lerner (2002) for 60 countries over 150 years, 
crystallise this tendency of defining 'strong' patent systems as those that are essentially 
'applicant friendly'.
8 Among the main criteria taken into account are the number of 
patentable subject matters (few restrictions is synonymous with 'stronger'), duration, and 
enforcement mechanisms (for Ginarte and Park, the provisions for protection loss are 
considered to be a 'weakness', while preliminary injunctions, contributory infringement 
and burden-of-proof reversal are viewed as a 'strength'). Lerner adds the total cost for 
full patent protection (17-20 years) and an indicator of discrimination against foreign 
patent-holders. 
 
Strong is probably the wrong qualifier for such policies, which should rather be referred 
to as applicant friendly because more domains can be patentable for longer, in more 
countries and with greater legal power. According to Gallini (2002, p. 147), “... the 
same policies that are perceived to have strengthened patent rights in certain ways also 
have weakened them”. By 'weakening', Gallini means that patents are granted more 
easily today than they have been in the past. However, no or little evidence is available 
to validate this assumption. One of the few authors who explicitly consider patentability 
requirement is O’Donoghue (1998). His theoretical model suggests that more stringent 
selection criteria would create longer incumbency (because it takes longer to perform 
more ambitious innovative projects) and, thereby, would raise innovation incentives. 
Dewatripont and Legros (2008) investigate the effects of patent races in a standard 
setting environment. They show that litigation threats contribute to reducing the 
propensity to file low-quality applications, while they also hinder the production of 
strong patents. One method of reducing this negative side effect would be to sharpen the 
filtering process. Farrell and Shapiro (2008) also emphasise the importance of filtering, 
as they find that determining patent validity prior to licensing is socially beneficial. 
 
Biased grant rates 
 
It might therefore be tempting to formally assess the rigour of the selection process as a 
factor in patent offices' grant rates (ie, the proportion of patent applications that are 
issued after the examination process). However, this indicator can be heavily biased. 
Indeed, assessing the rigour of patent systems on the basis of their grant rates can be 
 
8  Claessens and Laeven (2003, Journal of Finance) are among the many scholars who use Ginarte and 
Park’s index to evaluate the impact of patent 'strength' on economic activity. 9 
 
misleading for four reasons: metrics; patent flooding; divisional and continuation in 
parts (CIPs); and heterogeneous examination pendency.  
 
In terms of metric issues, patent offices rarely publish real grant rates. For instance, the 
EPO publishes the number of patents granted for a given year as a proportion of the 
total number of patent 'actions' in the same year (ie, refusals, withdrawals and grants). 
This practice provides a downward-biased approximation of the grant rate, especially in 
a period where the number of patent applications is growing quickly, because it does not 
account for the number of patents pending (see Harhoff, 2009, for a theoretical 
contribution). In this respect, a cohort approach (ie, the share of patents granted as a 
proportion of the total number of applications for a given year) is more appropriate. 
Indeed, official grant rates published by the EPO for 2007 and 2008 were approximately 
50 percent, whereas the cohort approach shown in Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe 
(2007) suggests a grant rate that fluctuated between 60 percent and 65 percent 
throughout the 1990s. Despite the significant increase in patent applications since the 
mid-1980s, the authors show that the EPO’s grant rate remained stable at around 65 
percent. This is somewhat worrying: if the permanent increase in the number of patents 
was associated with a drop in the average quality of these applications, a stable grant 
rate would mean that lower-quality patents have been granted. 
 
A second source of bias is related to patent-flooding practices, whereby applicants file 
many similar patents at once. Under such circumstances, there is a high probability that 
the patents would be allocated to different examining units, and to examiners with 
heterogeneous skills and varying experience. The grant of only one patent out of 10 
would be seen as a 100 percent grant rate by the applicant, despite the fact that the 
'official' grant rate would be 10 percent. 
 
According to Quillen and Webster (2001), and Quillen et al (2002), grant rates are 
further biased by the presence of divisional applications or continuation in parts (CIPs). 
With these procedures, one patent  can  give  rise to one or several subsequent patent 
applications with additional claims, and which would share the date of the first filing. 
From the applicant’s viewpoint, the granting of only one of these patents could be 
synonymous with a 100 percent grant rate, although the 'official' grant rate at the patent 
office would be much lower. When corrected for these sources of bias, the USPTO’s 
grant rate fluctuates between 87 percent and 97 percent, making it the most 'applicant-
friendly' patent office in the world. This can be compared with the corrected grant rates 
of 67 percent and 64 percent for the EPO and the JPO, respectively (1995-1999).  These 
figures indicate that the JPO and the EPO have adopted higher levels of stringency than 
the USPTO.  
 
A fourth source of bias is related to examination pendency. Stevnsborg and van 
Pottelsberghe (2007) provide an exhaustive list of tactics used by applicants at the EPO 
to delay the grant date. The grant date, in the case of the EPO, is synonymous with a 
significant jump in expenses (see van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2010, for cost 
simulations, and Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007, or van Zeebroeck, 2007, for 
evidence on delayed examination). If a patent is pending for 15 years, the assignee 
might decide to drop it into the public domain, a decision that does not affect its 10 
 
                                                           
potential use for 15 years (having kept the option to use it). The JPO used to allow for a 
seven-year lag (now three years) between the filing of a patent and the request for its 
substantive examination. Such a system provided applicants with ample time to assess 
the economic and technological potential of their invention. During this period, 
economically useless patent applications are withdrawn by the applicants, which 
explains the relatively small grant rate observed by Quillen et al (2002) for Japan. 
 
Grant rate indicators are, at most, biased approximations of patent offices’ rigour in 
their selection process. In addition, there is little or no information on type I and type II 
errors (patents mistakenly granted or patents mistakenly refused, respectively), which 
must occur to a certain extent. It is highly probable that 'wrongly' granted patents are 
more common than patents that are mistakenly refused. This is not only indicated by 
grant rates that are higher than 60 percent, but also by the very low proportion of 
'refused' patents (about five percent at the EPO), with the rest being withdrawn by the 
applicants (see Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007). The RIM versus NTP case is an 
interesting symbolic example of unfair forced settlement. It involved five patents related 
to Blackberry devices “that should not have been granted at first hand” according to the 
US Patent and Trademark Office. Apparently, five patents mistakenly being granted to 
the same owner cannot be categorized as ‘random’, but rather as the result of more 
systematic sources of error. As shown by van Pottelsberghe and Archontopoulos (2010), 
none of these patents went through the EPO process, and two were actually withdrawn 
within a short time, probably due to a negative communication from the European 
examiner. 
 
Litigation and opposition rates are also biased indicators. According to Hagel (2008) 
judicial review can provide the argument relevant for a thorough determination of 
validity. Hagel concludes that the only reliable assessment of quality occurs during 
infringement proceedings, when a litigated patent is held valid. But it could as well be 
argued that validation (and survival to litigation) rates are also biased and imperfect, for 
two reasons. First, the European experience, with its fragmented market, provides ample 
evidence of heterogeneous validity assessment.
9 Second, litigation proceedings occur 
only for a minority of patents and no information is available on private settlements (it 
can be cheaper to settle than to go to court, even for low-quality patents), or on the 
number of patents wrongly granted that are licensed to third parties. 
 
Theoretical concepts versus day-to-day practice 
 
There is a definition gap in the literature, which focuses on the breadth or scope of 
patent systems. Even when authors converge on what these abstract concepts mean, 
their definitions rarely refer to a day-to-day practice that is easy to implement, 
especially when compared to fees or length. For instance, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) 
define breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise prices. For Klemperer (1990), a 
wider breadth corresponds to “a larger region of the product space” that is included in 
the patent grant. Many other examples could also be listed. Although these definitions 
 
9 Indeed, Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2009) provide numerous examples where parallel litigations 
reached opposite outcomes (a patent held valid in one country and held invalid in the other). 11 
 
undoubtedly contribute to a better theoretical understanding of how patent systems 
work, the 'breadth' or 'scope' concepts are not easy to crystallise. 
 
Gallini’s idea that patentability standards have fallen is driven by one main observation 
– there are more (new) patentable subject matters, which has lead to a sharp increase in 
patent filings “...for which the US patent office has limited expertise or access to prior 
art .... most notably in the area of business methods” (Gallini, 2002, p. 148). If a decline 
in a patentability standard is observed over time for a given patent office due to policy 
changes regarding patentable subject matters and a sharp rise in patent applications, one 
might wonder whether international differences occur in patentability standards or in the 
way they are met. If patentability standards are the legal conditions under which a 
patent should be granted, an examination failure by the patent office would be a failure 
to comply with those standards.  
 
Few authors have investigated the operational routines put in place by patent offices to 
comply with patentability standards and, when they do, they tend to focus on one 
specific dimension of a multifaceted selection process. For instance, Scotchmer and 
Green (1990) suggest that novelty requirements and ownership rules ('first-to-file' 
versus 'first-to-invent') are interrelated concepts that affect the speed of innovation. 
Yamauchi and Nagaoka (2009) measure the impact of shortening the period (from seven 
to three years) allowed for requesting an examination at the Japan Patent office (JPO). 
They find that the primary impact is an increase in the workload of examiners with 
lower-quality patents. The consequences of the grace period in the United States are 
scrutinised by Franzoni and Scellato (2010). The role of pre-grant fees and post-grant 
renewal fees has been analysed in several respects over the past ten years (see de 
Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2010). Organisational and human factors have also 
been investigated. Cockburn et al (2002) examine the role of USPTO examiner 
characteristics (age, experience, etc.) on the resistance of patents to validity challenges 
in court. Lemley and Sampat (2008) investigate whether examiner characteristics affect 
the outcome of the examination process. Friebel et al (2006), and Langinier and 
Marcoul (2009) consider the organisational practices and incentive mechanisms adopted 
by patent offices to gauge examiners’ productivity. Lemley (2001) investigates the 
USPTO resources allocated to patent examination and argues that a patent office should 
not devote too many resources to ensuring a high-quality examination because there are 
too many patents with no economic value. As patent litigation mainly arises in relation 
to high-value patents, the court should be the 'right' place to properly gauge patentability 
conditions. Pre-grant opposition processes, as opposed to litigation, are investigated by 
Graham and Harhoff (2006), and Graham et al (2002), who explore how a pre-grant 
opposition process would improve the US patent system. Along a similar vein, Shapiro 
(2007) assesses how reforms related to the US patent litigation system (including 
procedures for patent re-examination and damage assessment practices) could improve 
the effectiveness of the patent system in fairly rewarding innovators. 
  
These theoretical and empirical contributions are part of a wide research field that 
focuses on the effectiveness of patent systems. Since they are focused, their implications 
are contextual and often fail to integrate complementarities with other features of the 
system. Scholars have rarely investigated the entirety of the processes put in place to check the patentability criteria in a systemic or comprehensive approach. In addition, 
most contributions explore only one patent office. 
 
 
4. Quality analysis: a two-layer framework 
 
This paper adds to existing literature by providing a more systemic analytical approach, 
which is then applied to three patent offices. Comparing the level of quality in different 
patent systems is challenging. As explained in the previous section, selection rates (eg, 
grant rates or litigation rates) are affected by systemic differences and heterogeneity in 
the propensity to rely on the patent system across countries (see de Rassenfosse and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2009). Therefore, this paper explores the quality issue from a different 
angle. Quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with their own 
patentability conditions in a transparent way. This definition makes it possible to gauge 
quality using a two-layer framework: the first layer is composed of the legal standards 
that describe the patentability conditions of a national patent system. The second layer is 
characterised by the operational design put in place to meet those legal standards.  
 
Figure 2. First layer: legal standards for patentability 
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Patentability conditions 
 
1. Subj. matter  
(restrictedness) 
2. Novelty  
(thoroughness) 
3. Inventiveness 
(rigour) 
4. Fees 
(affordability) 
 
The first layer reflects the broad dimensions of patent policy making. Four 
interdependent legal standards shape the main conditions for the granting of a patent 
(Figure 2): patentable subject matter, the identification of prior art (novelty), the 
examination process (inventiveness), and the fees to be paid (if fees are not paid, no 
patent is delivered). A 'classical' legal standard could have been added, namely the 
maximum duration of a patent. It is knowingly kept out of this analysis, however, 
because it is relatively homogenous across the US, Japan and Europe, and its 
implementation is clear-cut (ie, number of years). In addition, the length of a patent is 
not really a patentability condition, but a time limit that is applied if a patent is granted. 
 
The four legal standards that compose the first layer constitute the foundation of all 
patent systems. If fees and patentable subject matters are relatively easy to identify and 
measure (see Ginarte and Park, 1997, and Lerner, 2002), two key legal standards – 
novelty and inventiveness – are less easy to compare across patent offices. Indeed, these 
two legal standards might be similarly codified in several patent offices, but their 
implementation, or the extent to which they are fulfilled, might vary drastically. This 
paper puts forward that the degree to which a legal standard is satisfied depends on the 
operational design put in place by the patent office. Significant divergence in 
operational designs could lead to different degrees of quality (or rigor) in complying 13 
 
with patentability conditions. Table 1 lists the four main legal standards (LS) and 
describes the main components of the operational designs (OD) for the novelty and 
inventiveness conditions. It also briefly explains why each of these components might 
eventually affect quality and transparency in patent systems. 
 
The two-layer analytical structure has two main implications for the investigation of the 
degree of rigour (or quality) of the patent selection process. First, the four main legal 
standards should be considered as a whole, as they clearly interact with each other and 
form a coherent system. For instance, the quality of the search for prior art (the novelty 
legal standard, LS2) can be viewed as one component of the operational design of the 
inventiveness legal standard (LS3), because the quality of the search report will de facto 
influence the quality of the examination. In a similar vein, high fees would generate 
higher budgets (the elasticity of demand for patents with respect to fees is negative but 
much smaller than one) to secure high quality search and examination services. Second, 
the degree to which legal standards are met depends on the components of their 
operational design, especially in terms of the novelty and inventiveness conditions.  
 
Some of these components are more important or relevant than others in securing a 
transparent and thorough selection process. A relevance scale can therefore be used to 
gauge each component’s relative importance. Two approaches were used to build this 
relevance scale. The first method consists of allocating a relevance level on a 1 to 3 
scale. A value of 1 means low relevance, 2 means medium relevance and 3 means high 
relevance. For instance, the grace period concept (relevance: 1) is less important than 
the opposition process (relevance: 3). The second method consists of pair-wise 
comparisons of all of the components of an operational design. If component A is 
considered to be more relevant than component B, the former receives one point (see 
the comparison matrices in Appendix 1, Tables A.1 and A.2). The sum of the points 
received by each component creates a relevance scale. This second method shows more 
variance in the relevance level. For instance, for the novelty legal standard, the 
relevance metric varies from 0 for the grace period to 8 for the controlled adaptability 
component. 
 
A third alternative would be to ask experts or professionals (patent attorneys, patent 
lawyers, examiners) for their views on relevance. Such a survey could, however, be 
biased by institutional and geographical characteristics. Patent attorneys and patent 
lawyers would most likely favour few restrictions on subject matter and welcome high 
flexibility to adapt a patent over time. Examiners, in contrast, would opt for more 
decision power and less flexibility towards the applicants. Whereas such a survey would 
help to gauge the relevancy of the components in this analysis, the preference is put in 
this paper on the assessment based on logical considerations regarding the extent to 
which each component improves stringency and transparency. 14 
 
Table 1. Quality in patent systems: legal standards (LS) and operational designs 
(OD) 
 
System design  Importance for stringency and transparency 
(LS1) Patentable subject 
matter 
Some fields are less appropriate for patent protection, 
especially when alternative protection mechanisms exist, like 
copyrights (eg, software), plant variety protection or 
trademarks. Other fields are not patentable for ethical or 
security reasons (eg, the human genome, weapons). 
(LS2) Novelty condition  In most systems, novelty is the first condition that must be met 
for granting of a patent. It must be assessed with respect to the 
state of the art (published material or public disclosure at 
conferences prior to the filing date). Novelty concerns the 
description of a patent and its claims. The extent to which the 
novelty condition is properly assessed can be gauged through 
nine components of its operational design (OD2.1-OD2.9). 
OD2.1. Subject matters 
elevance (2, 3)
b 
If the prior art is not codified, cannot be easily identified or is 
part of common tacit knowledge, then the novelty condition 
cannot be properly assessed. This is typically the case with 
subject matters such as software, business methods or 
traditional knowledge. 
OD2.2. Ownership  
elevance (1, 2) 
The ownership of a patented invention can be allocated under a 
“first-to-invent” principle or a 'first-to-file' principle. The 
former aims at being fair under a 'natural rights' umbrella, 
whereas the latter aims to stimulate the inventor to apply for a 
patent as soon as possible in the invention process. The chosen 
system may affect quality, as the 'first-to-invent' rule not only 
discourages disclosure but also allows the first inventor to keep 
a claim on the market. In addition, litigation must start with the 
identification of the person who was 'really' the first inventor of 
the product or process.  
OD2.3. Identification 
elevance (2, 3) 
Relevant prior art should be listed to properly delineate the 
scope of protection being sought. The person that is primarily 
in charge of identifying prior art might affect the quality of the 
search report. If it is the applicant, one might expect to see 
strategic listings to a much greater extent than if it is the 
examiner. 
OD2.4. Search report 
elevance (1, 2) 
Producing and publishing a search report makes the information 
public. The report provides the applicant with a first assessment 
of the patentability of the invention (related to the novelty 
condition) and allows third parties to identify the filed 
invention in a transparent way. 
OD2.5. Language(s) 
elevance (2, 5) 
The ability to read and understand several languages de facto 
enlarges the stock of codified knowledge to which an examiner 
has access. The likelihood of retrieving additional relevant 
documents increases as the number of understood languages 
increases, which provides a better basis for the examination. 15 
 
Table 1 (cont.). Quality in patent systems: legal standards (LS) and operational 
designs (OD) 
System design  Importance for stringency and transparency 
OD2.6. Opposition 
elevance (3, 7) 
Given the possibility of filing an opposition, third parties can submit 
new, previously unidentified published material and documents to 
challenge the patentability of an invention for a much lower cost than 
litigation would entail. Post-grant oppositions frequently lead to 
revocation or amendments of granted patents. 
OD2.7. Grace period 
elevance (1, 0) 
The grace period allows applicants to file a patent for a certain number 
of months after a scientific publication of the invention. High 
'flexibility' could generate complex litigation, as scientific publication 
formats differ significantly from a patent format, and as 
authors/inventors may vary. For instance, the fabrication mode and the 
patent-related prior art are rarely included in scientific publications. In 
systems relying on a strong novelty condition, the grace period is 
problematic, as the wording of the claims might substantial diverge 
from the wording of a scientific paper. 
OD2.8. Controlled 
adaptability 
elevance (3, 8) 
Applicants frequently want to adapt their patent by modifying or 
enlarging the scope of protection (modifying or adding claims). This 
can be done by either splitting the patent into one or several smaller 
subsequent patent, or by filing new patents with the same priority date 
as the original application [ie, divisional applications and continuation 
in parts (CIPs), respectively]. These routines are increasingly used to 
delay the examination process and adapt the patented invention to 
existing technologies. They increase the degree of uncertainty in the 
system. If patent claims can be adapted and significantly modified, the 
relevant prior art might change, making the search report less relevant. 
OD2.9. Hidden patents 
elevance (2, 6) 
If the submitted patent can be hidden from third parties for a long 
period, there is more uncertainty on the market. Furthermore, this 
keeps other patent offices from identifying the patent as part of the 
prior art. Access of the file by third parties allows them to submit 
observations on the patentability of the invention. 
(LS3) Inventiveness  Novelty, as such, is not enough to grant a patent. An invention should 
be significantly novel or improve significantly upon the state of the art 
to the extent that it maintains market competition, reduces uncertainty 
and ensures sufficient protection for the inventors (Guellec, 2007, p. 
134). The extent to which the inventiveness condition is properly 
assessed can be gauged through seven components of its operational 
design (OD3.1-OD3.7). 
OD3.1. Novelty 
elevance (3, 4) 
If the novelty condition is not properly assessed, the quality of the 
examination might be undermined. The more comprehensive and 
relevant a search report is, the better the basis for the evaluation of 
inventiveness. 
OD3.2. Request exam 
elevance (2, 2) 
Whether the applicant has to request examination within a specified 
period from the application date affects the workload of examiners and 
the quality of pending patents. 16 
 
Table 1 (cont.). Quality in patent systems: legal standards (LS) and operational 
designs (OD) 
System design  Importance for stringency and transparency 
OD3.3. Definition 
elevance (1, 0) 
The legal standard might be more or less stringent, which 
influences the degree of inventiveness required for the granting 
of a patent. 
OD3.4. Incentives
a 
elevance (2, 3) 
Motivational aspects, such as social recognition, remuneration, 
working environment, good management and fair evaluation 
processes, play an important role not only in terms of ensuring 
a serious work but also in terms of keeping experienced 
examiners in-house. Weak incentives might ultimately increase 
the turnover of employees.  
‐ OD3.5. Skills, expertise
a 
‐ Relevance (3, 6) 
The education, experience and training of examiners influences 
an examiner’s ability to perform his/her task. Scientific and 
legal skills are required to carry out an examination. An 
examiner’s skill is also affected by the degree of interaction 
with other examiners. 
OD3.6. Low workload
a 
elevance (3, 4) 
If examiners are subject to a heavy workload, and have 
insufficient resources to perform searches and examinations, 
quality might be affected. A high workload per examiner might 
mean that examiners perform their tasks faster, which could 
result in a less thorough examination. 
OD3.7. Opposition pr. 
elevance (2, 2) 
The opposition process allows third parties to intervene and 
present potentially relevant arguments against patentability. 
(LS4) Fees  Fees affect the patenting propensity (see de Rassenfosse and 
van Pottelsberghe, 2010). High pre-grant fees reduce the 
propensity to file applications of dubious quality, but they 
might also reduce accessibility for young, innovative firms. 
High fees also contribute to the financial sustainability of the 
patent office, especially if high-quality examinations are 
correlated with high fees. High renewal fees lead to a higher 
drop-out rate of patents in the public domain, and contribute to 
the financial sustainability of the patent office. 
a. Indicates transversal components that might affect the operational designs of the two legal standards 
(novelty condition and inventiveness). 
b. The parentheses include two measures of the relevance of each component. The first is based on a 1-3 
relevance scale. The second is based on a bilateral comparison of all of the components of a given 
operational design. The number indicates the number of times one component was perceived to be more 
important than the others (see the main text and Appendix 1 for a more detailed description). 
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5. International comparison 
 
This section provides a systematic comparison of the legal standards and their 
operational design in three major patent offices – the USPTO, the JPO and the EPO. As 
the purpose of the paper is to assess relative degrees of quality, the three patent offices 
are ranked for each component of the operational design of their legal standards. Ranks 
range from one to three, which indicate a low and a high level of rigour or transparency, 
respectively. Different scores are used when the component of an office’s operational 
design has an obvious effect on the selection process (eg, better identification of prior 
art or a more rigorous approach in the examination process) and on the transparency of 
the system (eg, effective diffusion of information, and ease with which third parties can 
identify the patent) when compared to another office. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
LS1. Patentable subject matters 
 
Policies regarding patentable subject matters partly explain the difference in the number 
of patent applications among countries. In the US, the relatively few restrictions on 
patentable subject matters should, logically, lead to more applications. This is 
particularly striking for subject matters such as software, business methods, 
mathematical formulae, scientific discoveries and gene-related patents, as well as many 
other technological and scientific domains with lax patentability restrictions.  
 
According to Gallini (2002), patent policy changes in the US started in the early 1980s 
with the Supreme Court’s decisions on Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) and Diamond v. 
Diehr (1981), in which the Court extended patentability to genetically engineered 
bacteria and software, respectively
10. In the late 1990s, the patentability of business 
methods and financial service products were confirmed by the Court’s decision in State 
Street Bank and Trust v. Signature Financial Group. These decisions paved the way for 
the patentability of Amazon.com’s one-click internet ordering process, and other online 
auction or booking methods. As of April 2010, the US government was discussing 
whether to pass a law that would restrict the patentability of software and business 
methods, especially following the US Supreme Court’s Bilski decision (October 2008), 
which restricted the patentability of business methods.
11 Whatever the final outcome of 
to this specific case, the US system, in which “everything under the sun can be 
patented”, is recognised as much less restrictive than other systems in terms of 
 
10  Genetic engineer A. Chakrabarty (General Electric) had developed a bacterium capable of breaking 
down crude oil for the treatment of oil spills. He requested a patent from the USPTO but was turned 
down by an examiner on the basis of the law prescribing that living things were not patentable. The 
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals eventually overturned the case, writing that “the 
fact that micro-organisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law”. 
Sidney A. Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
in June 1980 ruled that a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under Title 35 
U.S.C. 101. The micro-organism constitutes a 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' within that 
statute. 
11  Bilski (Fed. Cir. 2008) is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) on the patenting of method claims, particularly business methods. The court affirmed the 
rejection of the patent claims involving a “method of hedging risks in commodities trading”. 18 
 
                                                           
patentable subject matter.
12 The 'only' fields that are not patentable are those related to 
abstract ideas, laws of nature, natural phenomena and human beings. Databases as such, 
including those covering gene expression profiles, are not patentable. 
 
Europe is much more restrictive and denies the patentability of many subject matters. 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) defines the concept of a patentable invention 
and details those fields that do not correspond to that definition, such as discoveries, 
scientific theories, mathematical methods, aesthetic creations, and methods for 
performing mental acts, doing business, or presenting information. Exceptions to 
patentability include inventions that are contrary to 'ordre public' or morality, plant or 
animal varieties, biological processes for the production of plants or animals, methods 
for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy, and diagnostic 
methods practiced on the human or animal body.
13  
 
Japan’s patentability restrictions fall somewhere between those of the other two 
systems, but it is closer to Europe. For example, the transgenic mouse is patentable but 
business methods, software and mathematical formulae are not eligible for patent 
protection. 
 
Subject matters, as such, cannot be taken as indicators of quality or rigour in patent 
systems. The only certainty is that fewer restrictions on patentable subject matter would 
 
12  In the US, the main article related to patentable subject matter is Article 35 U.S.C. 101 'Inventions 
patentable'. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this article. The Office requires that the claimed 
invention must produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result”. The purpose of this requirement is to 
limit patent protection to inventions that possess a certain level of 'real-world' value, as opposed to 
subject matter that represents nothing more than an idea or concept, or is simply a starting point for 
future investigation or research.  Subject matter found to be outside of, or exceptions to, the statutory 
categories of invention listed within 35 U.S.C. 101 includes abstract ideas, laws of nature, natural 
phenomena and the claimed invention that encompasses a human being. 
13  In Europe, two important EPC articles related to patentable subject matter are Articles 52 and 53. 
Article 52, 'Patentable inventions', includes the following points: (1) European patents shall be granted 
for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are susceptible to industrial application. (2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as 
inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical 
methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing 
games or doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information. (3) Paragraph 
2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to therein only to the extent 
to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities 
as such. Article 53, 'Exceptions to patentability', stipulates that European patents shall not be granted 
in respect of: (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' 
or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by 
law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States; (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision shall not apply to 
microbiological processes or the products thereof; (c) methods for treatment of the human or animal 
body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body; this 
provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these 
methods. Rule 27, on patentable biotechnological inventions, includes the following: (a) biological 
material isolated from its natural environment; (b) plants or animal if the technical feasibility of the 
invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal; (c) microbiological process other than a plant 
or animal variety. 19 
 
                                                           
automatically lead to more patent filings. However, some subject matters might be 
characterised by unclear or difficult to identify state of the art, which would affect the 
quality of the search report. 
 
LS2. The novelty condition 
 
If the content of a patent application has been published (or presented at a conference) 
prior to the filing date (often called the priority date), the novelty condition is not met 
and a patent should not be granted. Theoretically, this rule is straightforward and should 
normally be applied quite stringently. However, identifying the relevant state of the art 
is not always straightforward. A patent office’s ability to comply with this legal 
standard can be gauged through nine interrelated components of the standard’s 
operational design. 
 
OD2.1. Subject matters. The legal standard on patentable subject matters affects the 
quality of the search for prior art, especially when the subject matter includes non-
codified but well-known processes. For instance, software and business methods are 
technological areas for which it is much more difficult to properly identify the relevant 
prior art because of a lack of codification of previous inventions or because inventions 
are hidden in a source code. The USPTO, therefore, is less able to secure a complete list 
of prior art for the technological areas that are related to software, business methods and 
subject matters with incomplete codifications of their state of the art. As a result of these 
“unclear” subject matters, the USPTO would have a lower rank (1) than the JPO and the 
EPO (2) in terms of rigour (Table 3 lists the quality rankings for all components of the 
legal standards’ operational design). 
 
OD2.2. Ownership. The USPTO is one of only a few patent offices worldwide to give 
the ownership of a patented invention according to the first-to-invent principle. In the 
rest of the world, including Europe and Japan, the first-to-file principle prevails. This 
peculiarity affects quality in two ways.  First, the first-to-file principle has the advantage 
of stimulating an early disclosure of an invention, which makes it accessible to the 
public faster. With the first-to-invent rule, an inventor does not need a patent in order to 
maintain a claim on the market related to an invention.
14 Second, in cases of litigation, 
patent disputes will often start with the right of ownership issue, whereby the 'true' first 
inventor must be identified. Scotchmer and Green, (1990) argue that, in case of a 
technological race, the first-to-file principle might create excessive incentives for firms 
to stay in the race. In this respect, assuming that their theoretical model is supported by 
empirical evidence, the first-to-invent rule could be more effective in reducing 
duplicative research efforts, but this is not related to the quality of the patent system. 
 
OD2.3. Identification of prior art. The person that is in charge of identifying the prior 
art will de facto influence the quality of the search report (comprehensiveness and 
 
14  An example (taken from Scotchmer and Green, 1990) is provided by Yoshikawa (1987), who 
describes a patent dispute between the Japanese firm Sankyo and the US firm Merck. The dispute, 
related to an anti-cholesterol drug, was settled differently in Japan and the US because of the different 
ownership rules. Sankyo had the first patents on the two markets, but the patent was issued to Merck 
in the US because the firm could document prior invention. 20 
 
                                                           
relevance) and, therefore, the degree to which the novelty condition is met. The three 
offices have adopted different strategies for the implementation of the search report, 
although the strategies followed by the JPO and the USPTO tend to converge. In the US 
and Japan, a comprehensive list of prior art must be submitted by the applicant. In 
Europe, an examiner must undertake the relevant search report, which does not prevent 
the applicant from including a list of prior references in the submitted document. In 
Japan, the undertaking of search reports has been outsourced to the private sector for 
many years.  
 
In the US, an applicant is legally bound to disclose any prior art known to be material to 
patentability, which creates two potential biases. First is the possibility of overloading 
the reference section, so that the examiner might not be able to easily identify the most 
appropriate piece of prior art against which the novelty and inventiveness conditions 
should be checked. Second, some key technical references might not be listed by the 
applicant and, therefore, must be found by the examiner in its own investigation of the 
available prior art. The USPTO has been investigating the possibility of outsourcing 
searches since the early 2000s. The Office has started a proof-of-concept pilot project 
on the search reports prepared for international applications under the PCT. According 
to Kezenske (2003), contractors must demonstrate technical and legal competence, 
show that there is no conflict of interest between these and other searches they carry out, 
and agree to maintain strict confidentiality. Another parallel investigation concerns the 
role of search engine technology (with keywords) in the examination process. The study 
performed by Chin (2009) concludes that so far keyword search is unreliable as an 
exclusive method for locating patent prior art. 
 
Japan has outsourced search reports to independent organisations in the private sector, 
for many years. About 225,000 search reports were outsourced in 2008, of which 80 
percent (180,000) were 'dialogue-type' outsourcing.
15 The expansion of the outsourcing 
of prior art searches is mainly due to the rise of new search organisations, the 
recruitment of searchers by those new organisations and the increase in their processing 
capacity. In 2009, about 1,840 people worked for search organisations, of which about 
88 percent were employees of the Industrial Property Cooperation Centre, which 
includes a substantial number of former JPO examiners.  
 
The EPO has adopted a strategy that is opposed to any type of outsourcing to the private 
sector, as it feels it is particularly important to have the search report performed by the 
examiner
16. The implicit advantage of this practice is that it improves examiners’ 
 
15  According to the JPO’s 2009 Annual Report, 'dialogue-type outsourcing' means an outsourcing 
method in which the patent examiner receives the report on the search result from the searcher 
together with an oral presentation from the searcher. On the basis of this report, the patent examiner 
conducts a supplementary search when necessary. The officially registered search organizations 
include the Industrial Property Cooperation Center (all classes, 1,621 employees); Techno Search, Inc. 
(several classes, 94 employees); Japan Association for International Chemical Information (organic 
compounds, 22); Technology Transfer Service Corp. (amusement, 32); Advanced Intellectual 
Property Research Institute Co., Ltd. (opto devices, 21); Patent Online Search Corp. (amusement, 24); 
Pasona Group Inc. (automatic control, 14); and Protec Ltd. (semiconductor devices, 12). 
16  In the 1980s and early 1990s, search reports were handled by employees based in the branch of the 
EPO at The Hague, and the examinations were performed in the Munich branch. The late 1990s 21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
knowledge of the relevant prior art and, therefore, sharpens their ability to gauge the 
inventive step.  
 
In summary, the USPTO and the JPO face potential drafting problems, as applicants can 
fail to list relevant prior art or hide it in a long list of irrelevant references. Furthermore, 
the JPO relies extensively on outsourcing, and the USPTO is planning to evolve in a 
similar direction. In addition to the many sources of potential information asymmetries 
(competencies, conflict of interests and confidentiality), outsourcing does not contribute 
to the examiners’ knowledge of the prior art, as examiners receive the reference lists 
from third parties, from which they must assess the inventive step. The opposite is true 
at the EPO. For these reasons, the identification of relevant prior art might be more 
comprehensive at the EPO than at the USPTO or the JPO.
17 
 
OD2.4. Intermediate search report. The fact that search reports are not made publicly 
available (especially for domestic applications) indicates a lack of transparency on the 
part of the USPTO and the JPO, especially when compared with the EPO. The EPO’s 
search reports include all relevant prior art and are published along with the patent 
application 18 months after the priority date. Any patent application following the PCT 
route (regardless of the selected search authority) automatically leads to the publication 
of the patent and its international search report. The lack of search reports for domestic 
applications in the US and Japan reduces the ability of other applicants (or third parties, 
like entrepreneurs) to properly assess the patentability of their inventions and, therefore, 
makes the self-selection process less effective. The EPO systematically adds a non-
binding opinion on patentability to its search reports, which provides important 
information to applicants and serves to further increase the drop-out rate. 
 
OD2. 5.Languages of prior art(s). The novelty condition is essentially based on the 
formal identification of relevant prior art. Prior art is assessed within the scope of all 
published documents in the language(s) spoken by the examiners. For the US, this is 
essentially scientific and technical work published in English, and for Japan it is 
essentially scientific and technical work published in Japanese, although some English-
language documents are probably considered as well. One great advantage of the EPO 
in this respect is that most examiners are fluent in the three official languages (German, 
French and English). As they have access to a wider knowledge base than US or 
Japanese examiners, EPO examiners can therefore provide a more comprehensive 
identification of prior art. 
 
OD2. 6.Opposition process. In areas with a post-grant opposition process, third parties 
may challenge the patentability of an invention by submitting additional prior art that 
would have not been identified by the examiners. The EPO has a low-cost, post-grant 
opposition system that allows any third party to challenge the patentability of an 
 
brought the implementation of the BEST programme (Bringing Examination and Search Together), 
which is believed to have improved the quality and speed of the whole examination process at the 
EPO. 
17  The fact that the merger of existing prior art documents does not preclude to satisfy the novelty 
condition is another indicator of the 'softness' of the US identification of prior art. According to Barton 
(2000), prior publications in the US system would not bar issuance unless all features of the invention 
have been disclosed in a single prior publication, which is not the case in Europe. 22 
 
                                                           
invention for a period of nine months from the decision to grant. This intrinsic self-
correction mechanism improves the identification of prior art and may lead to the 
revocation of the patent. There is no post-grant opposition process at USPTO or JPO.
18 
In the US, there are two features that may lead to the cancellation of a granted patent: 
interference proceedings and re-examination. The former is a priority contest between 
applicants/patentees seeking to protect the same invention, while the latter may be 
requested by third parties or by the patentee during the lifetime of a granted patent. 
Validity challenges are also possible in Japan and in all European countries, but they 
take place within the frame of regular litigation. 
 
OD2. 7.Grace periods. The grace period is a period during which the inventor is 
allowed to publish an invention, generally through scientific working papers or 
conferences, and to submit a patent application on the same content at the end of the 
period, without being barred from receiving a patent for failure to respect the novelty 
condition. This flexibility is particularly welcomed by researchers and academic spin-
offs, because the patenting process does not obstruct or delay their publication output. 
Grace periods allow the authors of the published material to 'reserve' the invention for 
one year without the inconvenience or cost of filing a patent. It also delays the date at 
which the invention will fall into the public domain (see Franzoni and Scellato, 2010). 
For third parties, the grace period is therefore synonymous with a longer period of 
uncertainty. In addition, as a scientific article or a conference presentation is drastically 
different from a patent in terms of format and structure, the grace period can be seen as 
a time during which the applicant can substantially adapt an invention. In cases of 
litigation, the comparison of a patent with a scientific paper might prove to be an 
intellectually acrobatic exercise. The US’s grace period is one year, while it is six 
months in Japan.
19 Europe has no grace period. Notably, the grace period does not 
particularly improve transparency and the selection process. However, it makes the 
system more affordable or accessible to scientists and technology-based start-ups, which 
was the prime motivation behind the introduction of the grace period. This component 
illustrates the balance between affordability (or accessibility) and quality. 
 
OD2. 8.Controlled adaptability. Applicants naturally try to obtain the widest 
protective scope in order to maximise the strength of their patent in case of litigation. 
They are also motivated by the fact that technology evolves – patent owners try to adapt 
their claims so that that they fit the latest design of their invention. The EPO and the 
USPTO have drastically different approaches regarding the degree of flexibility related 
to changes to the number and content of claims. The flexibility depends on the type of 
changes that are requested. Three types of change may be considered: adaptation of the 
claims and descriptions for a given invention; significant adaptation, including many 
more claims and subject matter through the filing of subsequent patents (continuation in 
parts, CIPs); and the split of a large patent into one or several smaller patents (divisional 
 
18  Due to the 2003 revision of relevant lawin the US, the system of opposition to the grant of a patent 
was integrated into the system of trial for the invalidation of a patent, and can therefore be viewed as a 
litigation proceeding. 
19  In Japan, a request for grace period should be made when filing a patent application, with a supporting 
certificate filed in due course. If a patent application is filed within the grace period of six months 
from the date of first disclosure, the invention shall be deemed to have not lost novelty.  23 
 
                                                           
applications). The first adaptive mechanism is somewhat favoured by the EPO, while 
the last two are favoured by the USPTO. 
 
At the EPO, applicants may adapt their claims and description (change, withdraw or add 
claims) up to the grant date under the supervision of the examiner, provided that the 
changes do not add new subject matter.
20 This flexibility has been reduced since April 
2010, but it still exists to some extent. In Japan, applicants can amend the patent (ie, 
add, modify or withdraw claims) until the first office action, which provides a 
modification period of just over three years from the application date. At the USPTO, 
such amendments are more difficult – claims cannot be redrafted and a maximum of 
two modifications are allowed – but it is easy to file subsequent patents through the 
'continuation' process.  
 
Continuation application (CAPs) and continuation in parts (CIPs) are subsequent 
applications linked to a priority (first) filing, which share the same priority date (date of 
first filing). CIPs may add, change, or withdraw numerous claims to the original 
application. They are frequently used by applicants at the USPTO in order to maintain 
important claims under examination while enlarging the scope of protection. The 
possibility of adding claims in several CIPs provides an incentive to file further 
applications and adapt the scope of the intellectual property to the evolution of the 
technology. Companies increasingly use CIPs in the US, as illustrated by Quillen and 
Webster (2001), Quillen et al (2002) and Hedge et al (2009). This practice not only 
creates a substantial opportunity to adapt patents but it also artificially increases the 
number of patent applications at the USPTO. Hedge et al (2009) show that about 30 
percent of all US corporate-assigned patents included at least one continuation. CIPs are 
not allowed in Japan and Europe. 
 
The third type of flexibility arrangement – divisional applications – are patent 
applications (generally including a large number of claims) that are split into one or 
several smaller applications in order to ensure unity of the inventions (at the request of 
the examiner), to delay the grant date (a strategic behaviour of the applicant), or to hide 
some of the claims (among several hundred). They can also be used when the applicant 
does not yet know which claim could be useful. There are two side effects to this 
process: later grant dates and longer uncertainty on the market.
21 In Europe, divisional 
 
20  The extent to which a patent application can be amended (in terms of its description, claims or 
drawings) is governed by EPC Rule 137 'Amendment of the European patent application', which is 
allowed as follows: (1) Before receiving the European search report, the applicant may not amend the 
description, claims or drawings of a European patent application unless otherwise provided. (2) After 
receipt of the European search report, the applicant may, of his own volition, amend the description, 
claims and drawings. (3) After receipt of the first communication from the Examining Division, the 
applicant may, of his own volition, amend the description, claims and drawings once, provided that 
the amendment is filed at the same time as the reply to the communication. No further amendment 
may be made without the consent of the Examining Division. (4) Amended claims may not relate to 
unsearched subject matter that does not combine with the originally claimed invention or group of 
inventions to form a single, general inventive concept. 
21  The filing of divisional applications at the EPO is associated with abnormally long pendency. van 
Zeebroeck (2009) shows that this type of application represents almost 50% of the applications for 
which examination lasted 10 years or more. The slowing of the process may be encouraged by the 
willingness to postpone the costs of maintaining a patent in force in several countries. 24 
 
                                                           
applications are allowed, but abusive reliance on this option has been limited since April 
2010, when the EPC decided to substantially reduce the period during which a 
divisional application can be filed (before April 2010, unlimited subsequent divisional 
applications of divisional applications were allowed, with the extreme case being that 
claims could be pending for nearly twenty years).
22 The US system allows for intensive 
use of divisional applications.  
 
Overall, the US system is the most flexible with respect to the novelty condition, as it 
allows easy, numerous adaptations to the patent document while the priority date is 
maintained. The EPO and JPO are much less flexible. They therefore provide a higher 
degree of certainty and visibility to third parties. For small changes (under the scope of 
the invention described in the first patent), however, the EPO and the JPO are more 
flexible. They allow companies to adapt and fine-tune their patent under the supervision 
of examiners. One consequence of these heterogeneous practices is that examination 
pendency is generally irrelevant for comparisons of patent offices. At the EPO, the 
amendment of a patent induces communication and validation with the examining 
division, which naturally increase pendency: if the applicant wants a change, additional 
time is needed. In the US, flexibility is achieved through the filing of a CIP. In other 
words, a significant change in the targeted scope of protection actually takes the time 
needed to examine two or more subsequent patents. 
 
OD2. 9.Hidden applications. The possibility of hiding patents (or claims) introduces 
uncertainty in the system, especially for entrepreneurs who are active in the 
technological area covered by the hidden claims. In most countries, patent applications 
are kept secret (unpublished) for 18 months from the date of first filing, after which the 
patent application is automatically published. In contrast, the USPTO only 
automatically publishes patent applications for international markets (under the PCT 
route) after 18 months. Domestic applications targeting the US market alone can be kept 
secret during the entire examination process, and be published only if and when patents 
are granted.
23 This applicant-friendly specificity undermines the US patent system, as it 
encourages 'submarine' strategies that consist of keeping a patent pending (and, hence, 
unpublished) until a patent is granted, and then enforcing it immediately. In Europe 
(nearly) all applications are published 18 months after their priority date. It is only 
 
22  See EPC Rule 36, which states that an applicant has a maximum of 24 months from the examining 
division’s first communication in respect of the earliest application on which the divisional is to be 
based. This earliest application has to be pending at the time the divisional application is filed, and it 
cannot introduce new subject matter that extends beyond the content of the earlier application [Art. 
76(1) of the EPC]. This rule will substantially reduce the filing of divisional applications per patent 
application, limiting therefore the possibility to game the system. 
23  The USPTO website states: “Publication of patent applications is required by the American Inventors 
Protection Act of 1999 for most plant and utility patent applications filed on or after November 29, 
2000. ..., an applicant may request that the application not be published, but only if the invention has 
not been and will not be the subject of an application filed in a foreign country that requires 
publication 18 months after filing (or earlier claimed priority date) or under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty. ... As a result of publication, an applicant may assert provisional rights. These rights provide a 
patentee with the opportunity to obtain a reasonable royalty from a third party that infringes a 
published application claim provided .... and a patent issues from the application with a substantially 
identical claim. Thus, damages for pre-patent grant infringement by another are now available” 
(emphasis added). 25 
 
                                                           
possible to hide an application if it is refused by an examiner or withdrawn by the 
applicant before the official publication date. In Japan, all applications are published 18 
months after the application date. 
 
A second way of hiding proprietary technology is to file 'jumbo' applications, which 
include several hundred claims and pages. This method can be used even if the 
application is published. Finding the relevant claim, especially for a would-be 
entrepreneur who performs a freedom-to-operate analysis, is like finding a needle in a 
haystack. These applications generally lead to several subsequent divisional 
applications. Recently, large applications have become more expensive, as higher 
claim-based fees have been set by the USPTO and EPO. As discussed in OD.2.8, the 
use of divisional applications is much more limited at the EPO than at the USPTO. 
 
In summary, the nine components of the operational design related to the novelty 
condition, taken as a whole or individually, suggest that the US has taken a softer 
approach to the implementation of the novelty condition than the EPO. This is true in 
terms of identification of prior art and transparency (see Table 3). Japan is in an 
intermediate position – it is closer to the US on some dimensions and closer to the 
European system on others. The softness of the USPTO is characterised by: many 
patentable subject matters for which the state of the art is not properly codified, a first-
to-invent system, the applicant’s identification of prior art, the lack of search reports, a 
single working language, the lack of an opposition process, a long grace period, the 
possibility of substantially adapting claims and content during the examination process, 
and the possibility of hiding applications. 
 
LS3. Inventiveness 
 
In Europe, the legal standard for the inventiveness condition is that the invention should 
be significantly different from the state of the art or involve an inventive step. In the US, 
the condition is somewhat similar at first sight – 'non-obviousness' is required to grant a 
patent. The operational design put in place to test the inventiveness condition can be 
analysed on the basis of seven components. 
 
OD3. 1.Novelty condition. According to the UK Trade Marks, Patents and Design 
Federation (TMPDF), a timely, high-quality search is central to the quality of the EPO’s 
examination capability.
24 Therefore, less rigour in the identification of prior art, or a 
soft novelty condition, is a first element that might hamper the quality of the 
examination process. The relevance of an appropriate search report for the examination 
is also coined by several patent offices, which act as international search authorities in 
the PCT process.
25 The subsection on the novelty legal standards (LS2) provides 
 
24  “A high quality search underpins everything, for without it, the rest of the examination process can be 
a waste of time. Moreover, reliably good early searches can lead applicants to abandon applications 
that would otherwise clog the system” (TMPDF, 2008, p. 2). 
25  For instance, both the USPTO and EPO have declared that in the PCT route they would act as an 
International Preliminary Examination Authority (IPEA) only if they were also the International 
Search Authority (ISA) in the first phase. This practice clearly underlines the importance of the search 
report in the examination process. 26 
 
iate position. 
evidence that suggests that the novelty condition is softer, or assessed with less rigour, 
in the US than in Europe, while Japan is in an intermed
 
OD3. 2. Request for examination. A filing at the USPTO automatically leads to a 
search and examination, whereas an applicant must make a specific request for 
examination at the EPO and the JPO (otherwise, the patent falls into the public domain). 
At the EPO, the applicant benefits from a search report after 18 months, as it provides 
preliminary clues on patentability and, therefore, affects the drop-out rate (Lazaridis and 
van Pottelsberghe, 2007, show that 35 percent to 40 percent of all withdrawals take 
place before the request for examination, the majority being withdrawn just after the 
search report is provided, which attests to the usefulness of this request). At the JPO, a 
request for examination can be made for up to three years after the filing date. Prior to 
October 2001, this period was seven years. In Japan, the applicant’s decision process 
relies essentially on a self-assessment of commercial value, because no search report is 
made available. Yamauchi and Nagaoka (2009) show that the shortening of the request 
for examination period has led to a sharp increase in the number of patents to be 
examined, an increase that is logically associated with a fall in average quality.  
 
A request system reduces the number of examinations that are performed for patents 
that will not be used and, therefore, reduces the number of pending applications. With 
the new three-year lag for examination requests, nearly 70 percent of all applications are 
now examined in Japan, compared to about 55 percent ten years ago. At the EPO, about 
80 percent of all applications are subject to an examination request. The weakness of the 
request system is that it could prolong the period during which the unexamined 
applications may block other firms’ activities. This situation does not occur at the EPO, 
because the request for examination must be made just after the publication of the patent 
and the search report, or 18 month after the priority date. Furthermore, the search report 
is associated with a non-binding opinion on the patentability of the invention, which 
improves the self-selection process, as a decision to continue with a patent application 
can then be based on both the economic potential of the invention and the technical 
opinion of the examiner. 
 
How do these three processes affect the quality of the examination process? The 
combination of an 18-month period with a search report and a non-binding opinion 
allows for a reduction in the number of examination requests and also reduces 
uncertainty for third parties. In Japan, the examination request lag is longer (which 
further reduces the number of requests for examination) but is only based on the 
potential market value of the invention and not on its potential patentability (no search 
report is available). The USPTO favours speed but at a cost – more examinations to 
perform on patents with a lower average quality.  
 
OD3. 3. Definition. At the USPTO, the patentability condition that is assessed during 
examination is 'non-obviousness', which is perceived to be more lax than the criterion 
used by the EPO or JPO, which consists of an inventive step. The two concepts are 
somewhat similar but the practices used to assess them differ. At the EPO, the 
evaluation of the inventive step is based on the problem-solution approach and the 27 
 
                                                           
'could-would' concept. In the US, the concepts that prevail in courts are the 'teaching-
suggestion-motivation' test and the 'Graham' factors. 
 
The EPO’s inventive step is considered to be achieved if, when compared to the state of 
the art, the claimed invention is not obvious to a person 'skilled in the art' (European 
Patent Convention, EPC, Art. 56). In the early 1980s, the EPO adopted the 
'problem/solution' approach (Guidelines Part C, chap. IV, section 9; explained in 
Guellec, 2007), which requires the establishment of the objective technical problem to 
be solved (which corresponds to the difference between the invention and the closest 
prior art) and then considering whether the claimed invention (or 'solution' to the 
technical problem) would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art. Such a 
'person' is defined as an ordinary practitioner aware of what was general knowledge at 
the time of invention.
26  
 
In the US, the critical question is whether there is something in the prior art to suggest 
the obvious nature of the combination of previously known elements. This requirement 
is generally referred to as the 'teaching-suggestion-motivation' (TSM) test. In order to 
prove obviousness, this test requires a demonstration that some suggestion or 
motivation exists to combine known elements to form a claimed invention. The TSM 
test has been the subject of much criticism, as illustrated by the US Supreme Court 
decision in KSR v. Teleflex (2006), which held that the true test of non-obviousness is 
the Graham analysis.
27  
 
Some scholars argue that the non-obviousness rule has been relaxed in the US for at 
least some subject matters (eg, Gallini, 2002; Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2000). Comparisons 
of patent offices’ inventiveness from the definition of 'inventive step' or 'non-
obviousness' is far from straightforward. Notably, the rules in Europe (ie, the 'problem-
solution' approach and the 'could-would' concept) were created by the EPO to ensure a 
homogeneous approach for examiners from different countries and examination 
cultures. The TSM test and the 'Graham factors' were created and used by courts in the 
US (Federal Circuit Court and the Supreme Court), which indicates a more pronounced 
application of rules in the courtroom than in the patent office.  
 
Important elements related to the patentability condition may, however, contribute to 
pushing the EPO upward on the quality ladder: the notion of clarity and support by the 
description section (Art. 84 EPC), the notion of sufficiency of disclosure (Art. 83 EPC) 
and the notion of unity of invention (Art. 82 EPC). These provisions can be found in 
most patent systems, but it seems that the extent to which they are ignored varies across 
patent offices, which is probably related to the time allocated for a proper examination.  
 
26  The 'could-would' concept consists of investigating whether the skilled person would have been 
prompted to modify the closest prior art in such a way as to arrive at something falling within the 
terms of the claims. In such a case, the invention does not involve an inventive step and the patent is, 
therefore, not granted. 
27  According to the Graham factors, obviousness should be determined by: 1) the scope and content of 
the prior art; 2) the level of ordinary skill in the art; 3) the differences between the claimed invention 
and the prior art; and 4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. In addition, three factors might be 
used to provide evidence of 'non-obviousness': 1) commercial success; 2) long-felt but unsolved 
needs; and 3) failure of others. 28 
 
                                                           
 
In general, the arguments in this 'definition of inventiveness' section are not sufficient to 
conclude that the USPTO has a higher degree of inventiveness than the EPO or JPO. 
However, the EPO’s approach seems to be slightly more defined than the USPTO’s.   
 
OD3. 4. Incentives (wages and social recognition)- The incentive to stay at the office 
and perform a high-quality examination is related to employment conditions. USPTO 
examiners are civil servants with wages that are not particularly competitive. The 
position is often used as a stepping stone to higher-wage jobs in the private sector, jobs 
that require experts who know how to get a patent granted (NAPA, 2005, p. 82). One 
direct consequence is a high employee turnover at the USPTO – approximately 33 
percent per annum (the average employee stays three years). In Japan the patent office 
is a branch of the Ministry of External Trade and Industry (METI). METI employees 
have a fairly good wage and a high social recognition, which translate into low turnover. 
The EPO also has low turnover in its workforce (less than five percent) and very high 
wages, as examiners have the status of international civil servants and enjoy many 
additional advantages (such as holidays and educational support for children). The 
social recognition of EPO examiners falls into an intermediate position. The EPO is 
located outside the policy making arenas (it is mainly based in Munich and The Hague), 
and it is independent from European institutions.  
 
In addition to these structural differences in wages or social recognition, other incentive 
mechanisms have been put in place. The USPTO has a more pronounced orientation 
towards 'explicit' incentive mechanisms, whereby the quantity (and speed) of work 
performed by an examiner partly determine the wage, regardless of the quality of the 
examination.
28 The EPO and JPO rely more on an 'implicit' incentive scheme based on 
peer review mechanisms (several dimensions of the day-to-day tasks, including training, 
social interaction, improvement of patent classification and assistance to colleagues). 
The literature on agency theory (eg, Friebel et al, 2006) emphasises that explicit 
incentive mechanisms can be a powerful tool in cases of information asymmetries 
between the management of an organisation and its members. However, they can lead to 
behaviour that is detrimental to the goal of an organisation, especially when the work is 
complex and subject to uncertainty. For the patent examination process, explicit 
incentives exclusively based on quantity and speed are likely to negatively affect the 
quality of work. 
 
OD3. 5. Examination skills and expertise (education, experience and feedback). 
The very low employee turnover (less than five percent) at the EPO and JPO is 
evidently correlated with longer average experience of the typical examiner, especially 
when compared to the USPTO. An examiner at the EPO is recognised as fully 
operational after five years of training and experience. Since the examination process is 
complex, technical and legally binding, examiners with longer experience should 
 
28  Regarding the USPTO, M. Lemley reports that “There are strong structural and psychological 
pressures on examiners to issue patents rather than rejecting applications, no matter how weak the 
alleged invention seems" Lemley (2001, footnote 5). 29 
 
                                                           
deliver higher-quality service on average.
29 At the USPTO, almost 80 percent of patent 
examiners had less than three years of examining experience in 2009, while the share of 
examiners with more than 10 years fell from 20 percent in 2004 to seven percent in 
2009. This decline is the result of the aggressive recruitment of new examiners by the 
USPTO and a significant reduction in the number of experienced examiners (from about 
750 five years ago to about 400 today).
30 Lemley and Sampat (2008) find that 
examiners’ characteristics, including their experience, significantly influence the 
outcome of the examination process, which is an unexpected, socially suboptimal effect.  
 
The extent to which examiners interact is one aspect of the examination that implicitly 
affects an examiner’s ability to assess the degree of inventiveness of a patent. The 
survey presented in Friebel et al (2006) shows that examiners perceive their work as 
highly interdependent. In other words, poor quality work undertaken by one examiner 
increases the workload of that examiner’s colleagues. In this respect, the EPO has a 
well-defined, unique practice that consists of having a Division that makes the decision 
to grant a patent. A Division involves three colleagues in the examination process: the 
first examiner, the second examiner, and the chairman. This organisational routine 
constitutes a key quality check in the EPO process and institutionalises substantial 
interactions between examiners.
31 At the USPTO, the examination is generally 
performed on the individual level. Cockburn et al (2002) provide evidence of 
heterogeneity across examiners in their examination processes. This heterogeneity is 
related to experience, tenure and other characteristics. 
 
OD3. 6. Workload and pendency. Various measures of workload per examiner are 
presented in Table 2 for the year 2008. The ratio of incoming applications per examiner 
is presented in columns [4] and [5]. Column [4] shows the total number of applications 
for which a search of prior art must be performed – 74 at the USPTO compared to 59 at 
the EPO. In Japan, the search for prior art workload is less relevant, as it is outsourced. 
The higher workload for US examiners is exacerbated when examination duties are 
taken into consideration. Column [5] displays the number of patents for which a 
substantive examination must be performed. The two columns show a significantly 
higher workload in the US, especially for substantive examinations. The JPO seems to 
have a substantial workload, but this is due to the fact that patents in Japan are much 
smaller. This 'claim-number' effect is taken into account in columns [6] and [7], which 
present the total number of claims filed per examiner (for search reports) and claims 
under examination per examiner, respectively. For prior art searches, an examiner at the 
 
29  This positive correlation between an examiner’s experience and the quality of work is documented by 
the British Trade Mark, Patents & Design Federation: “A number of our members have experienced 
poor quality search and examination, which some attribute to the work of new recruits who have had 
less training and supervision than used to be provided” (TMPDF, 2008, p. 3). 
30 Cf.    http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/patent-examiner-experience-levels.html. 
31  The first examiner analyses the application, writes communications to the applicant and analyses their 
replies and amendments, and recommends granting or refusal. The second examiner checks the 
recommendation to grant (votum) or refuse, checks the form of the final text of a granted patent, and 
agrees to grant or refuse or sends the application back to the first examiner with comments. The 
chairman checks the legal and technical reasoning of the first examiner’s votum or refusal, carries out 
a detailed check of the text of the final application documents, and agrees to grant or refuse or sends 
the application back to the first examiner with comments. 30 
 
USPTO must tackle more claims than an examiner at the EPO. For substantive 
examinations, the average examiner at the EPO receives about 540 claims per year, 
about one-third of the 1,776 claims per examiner in the US and the 1,403 claims per 
examiner in Japan. 
 
Column [8] in Table 2 shows that the actual amount of work performed per examiner is 
also nearly twice as high in the US as it is in Europe. European examiners grant, on 
average, 15 patents per year, against 26 in the US and the much higher figure in Japan 
(which reflects smaller patents). These figures suggest that the incoming workload for 
examiners and their actual output are two to three times higher at the USPTO than at the 
EPO, while the JPO is in an intermediate position.  
 
Table 2. Rigour in the patent production process, 2008 
   Exami-
ners 
(EX) 
[1] 
Filings 
(IN) 
 
[2] 
Grant 
(OUT) 
 
[3] 
IN/EX 
(search) 
[2]/[1]= 
[4] 
IN/EX 
(exam) 
 
[5] 
INC/EX 
(search) 
 
[6] 
INC/EX 
(exam) 
 
[7] 
OUT/EX 
 
[3]/[1]= 
[8] 
Pendency 
in months 
 
[9] 
USPTO  6,055 448,000  159,961  74  74  1,776 1,776 26.4  32 
JPO 
(1)  1,680 391,002  154,699  n.r.  156 n.r.  1,403 92.0  (36)+32 
EPO  3,868 226,813  59,819  59  36  1,349 540  15.5  (18)+45 
Data source: Own calculations based on data provided in annual reports of the three patent offices, the 
Trilateral Statistical Report, 2008, and the WIPO Annual Report, 2008. (1) In Japan the search process is 
outsourced to external organisations, which makes “per-examiner” comparisons irrelevant for searches. 
[5] and [7]: The share of patent applications for which a request for examination is filed is 100 percent at 
the USPTO, 94 percent at the EPO and 67 percent at the JPO. The share is smaller in Japan because the 
applicants can wait up to three years before requesting an examination. [6] and [7]: INC stands for the 
total number of claims included in patent applications, which are computed from the average number of 
claims per patent filed – 24 at the USPTO, 23 for total applications filed at the EPO (PCT international + 
EU Direct), 15 for patent applications at the EPO for which examination is required (including PCT 
regional), and 9 at the JPO. 
 
The trends in workloads per examiner over the past 12 years are depicted in Figure 3. 
Comparing workloads is not straightforward: the JPO does not perform searches in-
house, while one must clearly distinguish between the workload for searches and the 
workload for substantive examinations at the EPO. At the USPTO, searches and 
examinations must be performed for all applications. Three observations can be made 
from Figure 3. First, the USPTO has always had the highest workload per examiner and 
the EPO has always had the lowest, while the JPO has been in an intermediate position. 
Second, a strong convergence between the EPO and the USPTO has occurred for search 
workloads. The USPTO sharply reduced the average workload through the recruitment 
of nearly 2,000 new examiners between 2002 and 2007, whereas the EPO constantly 
increased the search workload of its staff. Third, despite the USPTO recruitment efforts, 
there are still striking divergences in the examination workload. The average EPO 
examiner has addressed approximately 500 claims per year over the past 12 years, 
compared to more than 1,700 for the average USPTO examiner and 1,500 for the 
average examiner at the JPO.  
 
 
 Figure 3. Trend in annual number of claims under search or examination per 
examiner, 1996-2008 
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Source: Own computation from USPTO, EPO and JPO information on patent filings and average number 
of claims, and from the Trilateral Statistical Report for data on examination rates for the JPO and the 
EPO. 
 
One explanation for this considerable difference in workloads is the average time spent 
by examiners on each patent. Smaller workloads allow for longer pendency.
32 The EPO 
has the longest average pendency (63 months, 18 of which are for the search report and 
45 are for the substantive examination), which is similar to the average pendency at the 
JPO (68 months, of which three years are allowed for the request for examination and 
33 months for examination), but much higher than the examination duration at the 
USPTO (35 months, all inclusive).  
 
The relatively long pendency rate in Europe is not due to backlogs, but rather is 
endogenous and structural for five reasons. First, the slower process in Europe – longer 
examination pendency – means that examiners spend more time on each patent 
application than the time spent by examiners at the USPTO (35 months) or the JPO (33 
months). Assuming that all examiners possess similar analytical skills, it can be inferred 
that EPO examiners’ decisions are based on a more in-depth analysis of applications. 
This would, in turn, lead to a higher-quality patent (ie, higher rates of withdrawal or 
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32  Informal contacts suggest that a search for prior art is performed in less than two hours at the USPTO, 
compared to about eight hours at the EPO (see Lemley, 2001, for detailed data on the USPTO 
processes). For the examination process, a US examiner spends about 13 hours per patent, compared 
to about 30 hours at the EPO. This is confirmed by the Federal Trade Commission (2003, chapter 5, 
p5):  an average application gets only about 15-20 hours of patent examiner time. 32 
 
                                                           
refusal) or a higher degree of rigour in the selection process.
33 Second, the fact that a 
patent is validated by three examiners (the Division described in the examination skills 
component, see OD3.5), including a senior 'chairman', requires more time than a patent 
granted by a single examiner. Third, as explained earlier (see OD2.8), modifications of 
the legal scope of protection associated with a technology are achieved through the 
adaptation of the priority filing in Europe and through the submission of a new (CIP) 
filing in the US. The adaptive process at the EPO generates interactions and 
communications with the examiners, which logically generates delays. Fourth, 
applicants in Europe can easily request “oral proceedings”, which is particularly 
common when the examiner intends to refuse the patent or request significant 
amendments to the patent.
34 This results in more exchanges between the examiner and 
the applicant. Conversely, at the USPTO and JPO, examiners routinely issue refusals 
whenever the applicant’s reply to the first examination report is unsatisfactory. Fifth, 
applicants rely on various tools to delay the grant date, which is synonymous with high 
costs (translations, national validation fees and national renewal fees must be covered 
once the patent is granted).
35 
 
OD3. 7. Post-grant opposition process. At the EPO, the post-grant opposition process 
allows third parties to challenge the validity of a patent for up to nine months after the 
decision to grant. This process improves the quality of the European patent system, as it 
is much less expensive than patent litigation in court, and it allows third parties to 
produce new prior art or useful information regarding the validity of a patent. About 
five percent of granted patents are currently opposed at the EPO, while the US and 
Japanese systems do not have an opposition process, which means that challengers bear 
the burden of very high litigation costs (see Graham et al, 2002; Graham and Harhoff, 
2006; and Maskus, 2006, for qualitative and quantitative arguments in favour of the 
introduction of a reasonably priced, post-grant opposition process at the USPTO).
36 
 
LS4. Fee policies 
 
Low fee policies across the three patent offices seem to have contributed to the trend 
towards a higher number of patent applications. Although they are rarely considered to 
be effective policy leverage, patent fees do matter. Recent quantitative evidence 
 
33  Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) show that nearly half of the withdrawals can be considered as 
being induced by the work of EPO examiners because they occur just after a communication from the 
EPO. 
34  This is the “right to oral proceeding” defined in Article 116(1) of the EPC and the “right to be heard” 
defined in Article 113(1). 
35  The tools used to delay the grant date are listed in Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007). For 
instance, Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) show that one communication between the examiner 
and the applicant induces a one-year delay in the examination process, regardless of its outcome 
(withdrawal or grant). Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2010) provide evidence on the sharp increase in 
costs that follows the granting of a patent in Europe. 
36  Graham and Harhoff’s (2006) welfare calculations suggest that the benefit of a post-grant review 
mechanism could be nearly USD 25 billion. The main parameter affecting this estimate is not savings 
on the cost of litigation but the social costs of currently un-litigated patents that bestow excessive 
market power on some applicants. This market power either allows the patentee to extort licensing 
fees or forces competitors to invent around the respective patent. 33 
 
                                                           
confirms that applicants’ behaviour is influenced by the fee structure.
37 In Japan, entry 
fees (ie, filing and search fees) have always been very low at virtually zero (see de 
Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2008). In the US, these fees have fluctuated 
between USD 500 and USD 700 PPPs, whereas Europe is slightly more expensive. Up 
to the granting of a patent (ie, filing, search and examination fees), Japan and the US 
have cumulated fees of about USD 2,000 PPPs compared to approximately USD 5,000 
PPPs in Europe. Over the past 15 years, a downward trend in entry and total fees up to 
the grant has probably encouraged the increase in patent filings at the EPO. The 
relatively low fees in Japan and the US partly explain the large number of patent filings 
observed in these two countries (see van Pottelsberghe and François, 2009). 
 
An affordability index (fees divided by GDP per capita), which reflects the extent to 
which an inventor may be able to support the cost of patenting in his or her own 
country, is computed by de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2010). It shows that the 
US is, by far, the most affordable patent system, while the EPO is the least affordable. 
Japan is in an intermediate position. The authors also show that the US is the only 
country in the world where yearly renewal fees are lower than yearly application fees. 
Yearly renewal fees in the US actually decrease over time. 
 
The fee schedule should be sufficiently high to hinder low-quality applications. At the 
same time, it should not prevent young, innovative companies and universities from 
entering the system. For this reason, the USPTO and the JPO have had an SME-specific 
fee schedule for many years, in which these entities pay only 50 percent of the fees. The 
EPO does not have a similar schedule that favours small entities. This aspect is more 
related to affordability than to quality. 
 
Summary 
 
The qualitative analysis presented in this section is summarised in Table 3. In order to 
assess the relative levels of quality for the novelty and inventiveness legal standards, the 
three patent offices were assessed for each of the operational design components on a 1 
to 3 scale, from a low to a high stringency and transparency. The quality scale of the 
three patent offices for each component is motivated by the arguments provided in this 
section. For instance, the EPO scores 3 for the 'Opposition Process' (OD2.6), compared 
to a score of 1 for the JPO and USPTO.  
 
Since the components of a given operational design do not have the same relevance, 
they were positioned on a 'relevance scale' reflecting the extent to which they matter in 
terms of satisfying the legal standard in a transparent way. Two relevance scales were 
created (see Table 1 and Section 4). The first (W1-3) goes from 1 to 3, while the second 
(weights based on bilateral comparisons, WB) was created by comparing each 
 
37  It could be argued that fees should not play an important role because they constitute only a fraction of 
total patenting costs (which include services provided by attorneys, drafting support and searches for 
prior art). These costs are difficult to approximate (see van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2008) and are 
indeed substantial. See de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2010) for a survey of studies that 
estimate the fee elasticity of patent demand. On average, the fee elasticity of demand for patents 
fluctuates around -0.3: an increase of 10 percent in fees induces a decline in the demand for patents of 
about three percent. 34 
 
component with all other components (see Table 1 for a description of each component, 
and Appendix 1, Tables A.1 and A.2, for the bilateral comparisons of all components). 
The “weight” columns (W1-3 and WB) in Table 3 provide the relevance level for each 
component.  
 
Table 3. Quality assessment of the two-layer patent system 
 
   W1-3
1 WB
1  US   Japan   Europe 
LS1. Patentable subject matters      Many  Medium  Medium 
LS2. Search for prior art          
-           OD2.1. Subject matters  2 3  1  2  2 
-           OD2.2. Ownership (F2F vs. F2I)  1 2  1  2  2 
-           OD2.3. Identification of prior art  2 3  2  2  3 
-           OD2.4. Search report  1 2  1  1  2 
-           OD2.5. Language(s)  2 5  1  1  3 
-           OD2.6. Opposition process  3 7  1  1  3 
-           OD2.7. Grace period  1 0  1  2  3 
-           OD2.8. Controlled adaptability  3 8  1  3  3 
-           OD2.9. No hidden patents  2 6  1  3  3 
Weighted sum of OD2.x (W1-3; USPTO=100)      100  174  247 
Weighted sum of OD2.x (WB; USPTO=100)      100 185 259 
Thoroughness of prior art identification      Low  Medium  High 
LS3. Inventiveness          
-           OD3.1. Novelty test  3  4  1  2  3 
-           OD3.2. Request of examination  2  2  2  2  3 
-           OD3.3. Definition of inventiveness  1  0  1  1  2 
-           OD3.4. Incentives  2  3  1  2  2 
-           OD3.5. Skills, expertise  3 6  1 3 3 
-           OD3.6. Low workload  3 4  1 2 3 
-           OD3.7. Opposition process  2  2  1  1  3 
Weighted sum of OD3.x (W1-3; USPTO=100)      100  178  250 
Weighted sum of OD.3.x (WB; USPTO=100)      100  200  261 
Rigour in inventiveness check      Low  Medium  High 
LS4. Fees (pre and post-grant)      Low  Medium  High 
Broad selectivity (four legal standards)      Low  Medium  High 
(1) See Table 1 and Appendix 1 for a description of the legal standards, the components of their operational design 
and the relevance of these components for quality assessment.  
 
For instance, in terms of the operational design of the novelty condition, the 'ownership' 
and 'grace period' components have a weight of 1 because they are not the most relevant 
factors affecting quality in patent systems (the first-to-file system should stimulate 
applicants to display their invention faster and reduces uncertainty in case of litigation; 
the grace period adds some uncertainty for third parties). The opposition process and 
controlled adaptability have a weight of 3 because they play a key role in the examination process. With the former component, third parties can submit new prior art, 
while the latter limits the possibility of adapting patents to existing technologies. For the 
operational design related to the inventiveness legal standard, the novelty condition, 
workload and education/experience of examiners all have a weight of 3 because they are 
supposed to play a key role in the patent selection process.  
 
Figure 2. Quality level and demand for patent rights, 2008 
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Source: see Table 3. The quality metric on the horizontal axis shows the average position for the two 
quality metrics (the operational designs of novelty and inventiveness) presented in Table 3 (USPTO=100; 
JPO=176; EPO=248). The vertical axes show the number of claims filed per 1,000 capita on the left side 
and the total number (millions) of claims filed on the right side (the number of claims per patent is 
estimated to be 24 at the USPTO, 9 at the JPO and 23 at the EPO). 
 
In order to arrive at a broad approximation of the degree of quality of the novelty and 
inventiveness legal standards, the weighted sum of the ranks for the components of their 
operational design was computed. The results are indexed using the USPTO as a base 
(USPTO=100). There might be a degree of subjectivity (self-assessment by the author) 
in allocating the weights. However, the fact that the un-weighted sums would lead to 
similar results lessens this potential source of bias. Similarly, the logical elements used 
to rank the offices on a quality scale might be disputable and should be validated 
through more in-depth empirical research. However, it seems that the arguments put 
forward in this section provide a fair assessment of the situation. Table 3 indicates that 
the quality of the examination process is substantially higher in Europe than in the US, 
while the quality of the process in Japan falls somewhere in the middle. Using the 
metric developed in this paper, if the USPTO scores 100, then the JPO would score 
above 170 and the EPO would be at around 250. 
 
In the US, the relatively low quality or rigor of the examination process (due to the high 
turnover of examiners, the heavy workload per examiner, the soft identification of prior 
art and the lack of an opposition process) that is associated with low fees and the fewest 
number of restrictions on patentable subject matter have probably led to a very high 
35 
 propensity to patent, as it is easy and inexpensive to get a patent granted. Even if this 
indicator is subject to some measurement errors, the USPTO’s corrected grant rate of 87 
percent to 97 percent makes it the most applicant friendly. This high propensity to 
patent probably has given rise to enlarged backlogs. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
is Europe, where a thorough identification of prior art, associated with high rigour in the 
examination process and high fees, has led to relatively low demand for patents and a 
much less worrying backlog. Japan is in an intermediate position. For some components 
of its operational designs, it is closer to the US, while it is closer to Europe for others.  
 
Figure 3. Quality level and patent rights in force, 2008 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
50 100 150 200 250 300
Quality metric (USA=100)
Millions of claims in force
(left axis)
US
EPC
Japan
Japan
Claims in force per 1000 capita
(right axis)
 
Source: see Table 3. The quality metric on the horizontal axis shows the average position for the two 
quality metrics (operational designs of novelty and inventiveness) presented in Table 3 (USPTO=100; 
JPO=176; EPO=248). The vertical axes show the number of granted rights in force, with the number of 
patents on the left side and the number of claims on the right side (the number of claims per patent is 
estimated to be 24 at the USPTO, 9 at the JPO and 15 at the EPO). As the patent system in Europe is 
fragmented, counting all patents enforced would lead to a large amount of double or triple counts. The 
figure represents the number of patents enforced in Germany (as a proxy for Europe), where 95 percent of 
EPO patents are validated after they are granted. 
 
 
The ultimate consequence of these heterogeneous degrees of quality across patent 
systems can be gauged through the demand for patent rights, or through the number of 
patents or claims in force in the three geographical areas. Figure 2 presents the 
relationship between the degree of quality in a patent system, and the number of claims 
filed in absolute and relative terms. About 35 claims per 1,000 capita are filed at the 
USPTO per year (more than 10 million claims were filed in 2008), compared to 8/1,000 
capita in Europe (more than five million claims were filed in 2008). In Japan, 27 claims 
were filed per 1,000 capita (nearly four million claims). The two curves indicate a 
logical negative relationship between quality and the demand for patent rights. 
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Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the degree of quality in a patent system and 
the number of patent rights (or claims) in force in absolute and relative terms. About 46 
million claims are in force in the US, compared to eight and 12 million in Europe and 
Japan, respectively. A similar relationship is evident in terms of the number of claims 
per 1,000 capita. In other words, the lower the degree of quality in a patent office, the 
higher the number of patents – of questionable legitimacy – in force in the system. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The main objective of this paper is to test if the quality of the examination services 
performed by a patent office can affect the demand for patent rights. This broad 
objective requires a methodology for assessing the degree of quality in patent systems 
and measuring the extent to which quality varies across countries. We claim that a 
systemic approach must be adopted in order to compare quality across patent systems. 
Economic analyses of quality in patent systems to date have frequently relied on ill-
defined concepts of 'strength' or 'breadth'. Whereas these two concepts are useful for 
theoretical modelling, they have limited concrete implications for policy. In addition, 
output rates, such as grant rates or litigation rates, can be biased by the strategic 
behaviour adopted by applicants and are hardly comparable across countries because of 
their systemic differences. 
 
This paper, therefore, offers a new methodological framework that takes the systemic 
dimension of patent systems into account. The concept of quality is defined as the 
extent to which patent offices comply in a transparent way with the main legal standards 
that rule patentability conditions in their jurisdictions. The methodology consists of a 
two-layer analytical framework composed of 'legal standards' (first layer) and their 
'operational design' (second layer). Four legal standards are taken into account: subject 
matter, novelty, inventiveness and the fee schedule. Patent offices have similar codified 
rulings related to the novelty and the inventiveness requirements. Therefore, an in-depth 
analysis of the operational designs put in place to comply with these requirements must 
be performed in order to assess quality. We identify several components of the 
operational designs of the novelty and inventiveness requirements. These components 
vary in relevance (two relevance metrics are used) and allow the comparison of patent 
offices on a Likert scale (from 1 for a low contribution to the selection mechanism and 
weak transparency to 3 for a high contribution and strong transparency). This 
methodological approach leads to two main conclusions and one policy implication. 
 
First, a country’s legal standards and the components of patent offices' operational 
design interact with each other and form a coherent system. For instance, the soft 
identification of prior art (or incomplete search reports for the novelty legal standard) 
may undermine the inventiveness legal standard. Similarly, the patentability of 
controversial subject matters (eg, business methods) affects the quality of search reports 
because prior art for these subject matters is not accessible or imperfectly codified. 
Further research should aim at validating the list of components that should be taken 
into account when characterising operational designs, their level of relevance and the 38 
 
ratings of patent offices. However, we believe that the selected components and their 
assessment provide a fair preliminary approximation of quality in patent systems. 
 
Second, the analysis of three major economic areas (Europe, the US and Japan) 
highlights significant international differences in the extent to which patent systems 
fulfil their objectives. The patent selection process at the USPTO is less rigorous and 
transparent than at the EPO, as evidenced by the soft, flexible identification of prior art 
and the lower degree of inventiveness. This lower level of rigour and transparency, 
coupled with low fees, has led to an unmatched and unprecedented number of yearly 
applications, and to patents of dubious quality being put into force (nearly 50 million 
claims) in the US market. There appear to be fewer divergences in terms of the legal 
standards that set the patentability conditions than in terms of operational design, which 
include the education and experience of examiners, their incentives, their workloads, 
and operational routines, such as requests for examination, the opposition process, 
publication of search reports, or the ease of adapting the scope of protection through 
claim changes or the filing of continuation in parts. In Europe, more restrictions on 
patentable subject matters, higher rigour in the identification of prior art, stricter 
evaluations of inventiveness and high fees translate into a significantly lower number of 
patent applications than at the USPTO, and fewer patents being in force in the market 
(approximately eight million claims are in force in Europe). Japan is in an intermediate 
position.  
 
Gallini (2002) attributes the decline in patent standards largely to “the sharp rise in 
[patent] applications on products and processes in new subject areas for which the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office has limited expertise or access to prior art”. This idea is 
firmly grounded, but the reverse causality is probably even stronger: lower standards 
induce more applications, because it is easier to get a patent granted. A vicious cycle 
therefore arises in which lax patent standards induce more applications, which in turn 
further reduce quality standards, as examiners become overloaded. This is the main 
hypothesis put forward by Jaffe and Lerner (2004) to explain the 'broken' patent system 
in the US. Policymakers at large (politicians, patent offices, judges) stand accused of 
designing the patent system in such a way that its current plight of a ever-growing 
numbers of patent filings of dubious quality was inevitable. The present paper provides 
further empirical evidence in support of Jaffe and Lerner's hypothesis. 
 
One important policy implication concerns ongoing attempts to converge towards a 
global patent system, whereby the largest patent offices would enter into work sharing 
and eventually a mutual-recognition process in which a patent granted by office Y 
would be automatically granted by office Z. This desire for cooperation is evidenced by 
the growing number of bilateral Patent Prosecution Highway (PPHs) pilot projects 
signed and operated by the USPTO, the JPO, the EPO and several other national patent 
offices in Europe or Asia. Under the PPHs, a patent office Z that receives a search 
report or examination report made by another patent office Y, must perform its own 
search and examination reports much faster than would be required for a regular 
application. However, this work-sharing process (embedded with some sort of mutual 
recognition) can harm the patent system of country Z if the degree of quality in patent 39 
 
                                                           
office Y is manifestly lower. This issue is particularly relevant for EPO examiners, who 
have a legal duty to perform a relevant search report themselves. 
 
As long as the quality of the examination process is not harmonised across major patent 
offices, and as long as their operational designs diverge, moves towards several bilateral 
work sharing and mutual recognition agreements might actually drive global patent 
quality towards the lowest common denominator. Prior to entering into mutual 
recognition processes, patent offices should converge in terms of their operational 
designs, a process that requires the tackling of painful questions related to examiners’ 
incentives, education, training and workloads. In addition, post-grant opposition 
processes, intermediate requests for examination and the degree to which patent 
applications can be adapted during the examination through continuation in parts or 
divisional applications (ie, controlled adaptability) must also be similar. In this respect, 
the components of the operational designs presented in this paper can act as a useful 
checklist for a potential convergence process. Furthermore, one must keep in mind that 
although Europe performs better in terms of quality, it does little in terms of 
accessibility or affordability for young, innovative companies, universities and 
scientists. Several components of a patent system’s operational design exist to provide 
easier access to the system, including sharp fee reductions for SMEs and grace periods. 
These details do not improve the degree of quality in a patent system but they might 
ensure that those for whom the patent system was originally created can make use of it.  
  
Thomas Jefferson (1794) penned perhaps one of the best-known maxims: “Patents 
should draw a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment 
of an exclusive patent, and those which are not. Patents are, after all, government-
enforced monopolies and so there should be some ‘embarrassment’ (and hesitation) in 
granting them”.
38 This illustrates the importance of deploying a rigorous examination 
process to ensure a sound patent policy. An opposing view was advocated by Mark 
Lemley (2001) through his 'rational ignorance' argument, whereby patent offices should 
not devote too many resources to examination, because only a few patents are worthy of 
those resources, and these can be properly assessed in litigation proceedings. The 
economic literature provides little insight about the optimal degree of quality or rigour 
that should prevail in a patent system. In fact, the two extreme levels of quality could 
actually be detrimental to innovation. This paper, therefore, aims to contribute to the 
debate by developing a methodological framework that allows for assessments and 
comparisons of quality across patent offices. Our findings suggest that the EPO is closer 
to Jefferson’s perspective, whereas the USPTO is closer to the 'rational ignorance' 
pathway. However, it is still unclear whether Europe is already too low on the quality 
ladder or whether the US is still too high. 
 
 
38  Quoted in the signature of Michael Murer, Examiner on Sporting Goods, European Patent Office, in 
an email received on March 31, 2010. 40 
 
References 
 
Archontopoulos E., D. Guellec, N. Stevnsborg, B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, and N. 
van Zeebroeck (2007) 'When small is beautiful: Measuring the evolution and 
consequences of the voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO', Information 
Economics and Policy 19(2), 103-132 
Arora A., A. Fosfuri, and A. Gambardella (2002) Markets for Technology: The Economics 
of Innovation and Corporate Strategy, MIT Press 
Barton J.H. (2000) 'Reforming the patent system', Science, 287(5460), 1933-1934 
Barzel, Y. (1968) 'Optimal timing of innovation', Review of Economics and Statistics, 50, 
348-355 
Bessen J. and M. J. Meurer (2008) Patent Failure: How Judges, Lawyers and Bureaucrats 
Put Innovators at Risk, Princeton University Press 
Caillaud B. and A. Duchêne (2009) 'Patent Office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect', 
Paris School of Economics, Working Paper, 2009-39 
Chang H. F. (1995) 'Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation', RAND 
Journal of Economics, 26(1), 34-57 
Chesbrough H. (2003) Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting 
from Technology, Harvard Business School Press, pp. 227 
Chin A. (2009) 'Search for tomorrow: some side effects of patent office automation', North 
Carolina Law Review, 87, 1617-1656 
Claessens S. and L. Laeven (2003) 'Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth', 
Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2401-2436 
Cockburn, I. M., S. Kortum, S. Stern (2002) 'Are All Patent Examiners Equal? The Impact 
of Examiner Characteristics', NBER Working Paper Series, w8980 
Cornelli, F., Schankerman, M. (1999) 'Patent renewals and R&D incentives', RAND Journal 
of Economics, 30(2), 197-213 
Danguy J., G. de Rassenfosse, and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) 'The R&D-
patent relationship: An industry perspective', EIB Papers, No 7/2009 
Danguy J. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) 'Cost-benefit analysis of the 
community patent', Bruegel Working Paper, 2009/08 
de Rassenfosse G. (2010) 'How much do we know about firms’ propensity to patent and 
should we worry about it?' ECARES Working Paper, forthcoming 
de Rassenfosse G., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) 'Per un pugno di dollari: A 
first look at the price elasticity of patents', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(4), 
588-604 
de Rassenfosse G. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2008) 'On the price elasticity of 
demand for patents', ECARES Working Paper, 2008-031 
de Rassenfosse G. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) 'A policy insight into the 
R&D-patent relationship', Research Policy, 38(5), 779-792 
de Rassenfosse G. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2010) 'The role of fees in patent 
systems: theory and evidence', ECARES Working Paper, forthcoming 
Dernis, H., D. Guellec and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) 'Using patent counts 
for cross-country comparisons of technology output', STI Review, 27, OECD, Paris 
Dewatripont M. And P. Legros (2008) '“Essential” patents, FRAND royalties and 
technology standards', ECARES Working Paper 2008_010 41 
 
Encaoua D., D. Guellec, and C. Martínez (2006) 'Patent systems for encouraging innovation: 
Lessons from economic analysis', Research Policy, 35(9), 1423-1440 
EPO (2007) Scenarios for the future, How might IP regimes evolve by 2025? What global 
legitimacy might such regimes have? Munich, 125 P 
EPO (2010) Guidelines for examination in the European Patent Office, Munich, 597 p 
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (2008) 'How strong are weak patents?' American Economic 
Review, 98(4): 1347–69 
Federal Trade Commission (2003) 'To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance Between 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy', 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
Franzoni C. and G. Scellato (2010) 'The grace period in international patent law and its 
effect on the timing of disclosure', Research Policy, 39, 200-213 
Friebel G., A. Koch, D. Prady and P. Seabright (2006) Objectives and incentives at the 
European Patent Office, Centre IDEI – Institut d’Economie Industrielle, Université de 
Toulouse 
Gallini, N. (1992) 'Patent policy and costly imitation', RAND Journal of Economics, 23(1), 
52-63.Ginsburgh V., 2005, Languages, Genes, and Cultures, Journal of Cultural 
Economics, 29 (1), 1-17 
Gallini, N. ( 2002) 'The economics of patents: Lessons from recent U.S. patent reform', 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2), 131-154 
Geuna A. and L. Nesta (2007) 'University patenting and its effects on academic research: 
The emerging European evidence', Research Policy, 35(6), 790-807 
Gilbert, R., Shapiro, C. (1990) 'Optimal patent length and breadth', RAND Journal of 
Economics, 21(1), 106-112 
Ginarte J. and W. Park (1997) 'Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study', 26(3), 
283-301 
Glazier, S. (2000) Patent Strategies for Business, Third Edition, LBI Institute, Washington 
DC, 420 p 
Graham S. and D. Harhoff (2006) 'Can post-grant reviews improve patent system design? A 
twin study of US and European patents', CEPR Discussion Paper 5680, 29 p 
Graham S., B. Hall, D. Harhoff and D. Mowery (2002) 'Post-issue patent 'quality control': a 
comparative study of US patent re-examinations and European patent oppositions', 
NBER Working Paper No. W8807 
Grossman G. And E. Lai (2004) 'International protection of intellectual property', American 
Economic Review, 94(5), 1635–1653 
Guellec, D. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000) 'Applications, grants and the 
value of patents', Economic Letters, 69(1), 109-114 
Guellec D. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) The Economics of the European 
Patent System, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Guellec D., B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and N. van Zeebroeck (2007) 'Patent as a 
market instrument', Chapter 4,  in Guellec D. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
The Economics of the European Patent System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 
85-113 
Hagel F. (2008) 'Quality of patents: the role of information inputs', Patent World, Issue 199, 
30-32 42 
 
Hall B. H. and R. H. Ziedonis (2001) 'The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of 
Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995', RAND Journal of Economics, 
32(1), 101-128 
Harhoff D. (2008) 'Strategic patenting, innovation and competition: towards subprime 
patents?' Presentation prepared for the Jacquemin Seminar Series, Brussels – 7 
November 2008 
Harhoff D. (2009) 'Economic cost-benefit analysis of a unified and integrated European 
patent litigation system', EC DG Internal Market Report, MARKT/2008/06/D 
Harhoff D. (2009b) How to compute grant rates, presentation at the EPO/OECD conference, 
Vienna, October 
Harhoff D., K. Hoisl, B. Reichl and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) 'Patent 
Validation at the Country Level – the Role of Fees and Translation Costs', 38(9), pp. 
1423-1437 
Harhoff D., K. Hoisl and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2008) 'Languages, Fees and 
the International Scope of Patenting', ECARES Working Paper 2009_10 
Harhoff D., F. Scherer, and K. Vopel (2003) 'Citations, family size, opposition and the value 
of patent rights', Research Policy, 32(8), 1343-1363 
Hegde D., D. Mowery, and S. Graham (2009) 'Pioneering Inventors or Thicket Builders: 
Which U.S. Firms Use Continuations in Patenting?' Management Science, 55(7), 1214-
1226 
Jaffe, A. (2000) 'The U.S. patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation 
process', Research Policy, 29(4-5), 531-557 
Jaffe, A., Lerner, J. (2004) Innovation and its discontents: How our broken patent system is 
endangering innovation and progress, and what to do about it, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey, 236 p 
Kazenske, E. (2003) 'The future of prior art searching at the United States patent and 
trademark office', World Patent Information, 25(4), 283-287 
Klemperer, P. (1990) 'How broad should the scope of patent protection be?' RAND Journal 
of Economics, 29(1), 113-130 
Kortum S. and J. Lerner (1999) 'What is behind the recent surge in patenting?' Research 
Policy, 28(1), 1-22 
Langinier C. and P. Marcoul (2009) 'Monetary and Implicit Incentives of Patent Examiners', 
May, Working Paper, University of Alberta 
Lazaridis G., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) 'The rigour of EPO’s 
patentability criteria: An insight into the “induced withdrawals”', World Patent 
Information, 29(4), 317-326 
Lemley, M. (2001) 'Rational ignorance at the patent office', Northwestern University Law 
Review, 95(4), 1495-1528 
Lemley, M. and B. Sampat (2008) 'Examiner Characteristics and the Patent Grant Rate', 
mimeo: http://www.nber.org/~confer/2008/si2008/IPPI/lemley.pdf, last access: 
31/05/2010 
Lissoni, F., P. Llerena, M. McKelvey, and B. Sanditov  (2008) 'Academic patenting in 
Europe: new evidence from the KEINS database', Research Evaluation, 17(2), 87-102 
Mazzoleni R. and R. Nelson (1998) 'The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: a 
contribution to the current debate', Research Policy, 27, 273-284 
Maskus K. E. (2006) 'Reforming U.S. patent policy: getting the incentives right', CSR 19, 
November, Council on Foreign Relations, USA, 45 p 43 
 
Mejer M. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) 'Economic incongruities in the 
European Patent System', Bruegel Working Paper, 2009/01 
Mejer M. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2010) 'Patent Backlogs at USPTO and 
EPO:  systemic failure vs intentional delays', forthcoming 
Mowery, D. and Sampat, B. (2004) 'The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University–Industry 
Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?' Journal of Technology 
Transfer, 30(1–2): 115–27 
Nordhaus, W. (1969) 'Invention, growth and welfare: A theoretical treatment of 
technological change', M.I.T. monographs in economics, 10, 168 pp., M.I.T. Press, 
Cambridge, MA 
NAPA -National Academy of Public Administration (2005) 'U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office: Transforming to meet the challenges of the 21st century', available at: 
http://www.napawash.org/Pubs/PTO-8-25-05.htm 
O’Donoghue T. (1998) 'A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation', RAND 
Journal of Economics, 29(4), 654-679 
Peeters C. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2006) 'Innovation strategy and the 
patenting performances of large firms', Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 16(1-2), 
109-135 
Quillen, C. and O. Webster (2001) 'Continuing patent applications and performance of the 
U.S. Patent Office', Federal Circuit Bar Journal, 11(1), 1-21 
Quillen, C., O. Webster, and R. Eichmann (2002) 'Continuing patent applications and 
performance of the US Patent and Trademark Office - Extended', Federal Circuit Bar 
Journal, 12(1), 35-55 
Sampat B. (2005), 'Determinants of patent quality: an empirical analysis', working paper, 
Columbia University 
Scherer, F.M. (1972) 'Nordhaus’ theory of optimal patent life: a geometric reinterpretation', 
American Economic Review, 62, 422-427 
Scherer, F.M. (2002) ‘The economics of the human gene patents’, Academic Medicine, 
77/12 part 2: 1348-1367 
Scotchmer, S. (1991) 'Standing on the shoulder of giants: cumulative research and the patent 
law', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 29-41 
Scotchmer, S. (1999) 'On the optimality of the patent renewal system', RAND Journal of 
Economics, 30(2), 181-196 
Scotchmer, S. and Green, J. (1990) ‘Novelty and disclosure in patent law’, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 21/1: 131-146 
Seckelmann M. (2001) 'The Quest for Legal Stability: Patent Protection within the German 
Empire, 1871 – 1903', Max-Planck-Institute for European Legal History, EBHA 
Conference 2001: Business and Knowledge 
Shapiro C. (2007) 'Patent reform: aligning reward and contribution', Innovation Policy and 
the Economy, 8, 111-156 
Sherry E. and D. Teece, (2004) 'Royalties, evolving patent rights, and the value of 
innovation', Research Policy, 33(2), pp. 179-191 
Stevnsborg N. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) 'Patenting Procedures and 
Filing Strategies, in Guellec', D. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Economics 
of the European Patent System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 6, p. 
155-183 44 
 
TMPDF (2008) 'EPO future workload study; document CA144/07 – Comments by TMPDF: 
May 2008', ref PP05/08, Trade Marks, Patents & Design Federation, UK, London, 11p 
Teece D. (1993) 'Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy', Research Policy, 22(2), pp. 112-113 
van Pottelsberghe B. (2009) Lost property: The European patent system and why it doesn’t 
work, Bruegel Blueprint, Brussels, Belgium 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and E. Archontopoulos (2010) 'EU’ve got a message: 
policy learning from the RIM-NTP patent litigation', ECARES Working Paper, 
forthcoming 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and D. François (2009) 'The cost factor in patent 
systems', Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 9(4), 329-355 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and M. Mejer (2010) 'The London agreement and the 
cost of patenting in Europe', European Journal of Law and Economics, 29(2), 211-237 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and N. van Zeebroeck (2008) 'A brief history of space 
and time: the scope-year index as a patent value indicator based on families and 
renewals', Scientometrics, 75(2), May, 319–338 
van Zeebroeck N. (2007) 'Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis in Europe', 
Working Papers CEB 07-028 
van Zeebroeck N. (2009) 'Filing strategies and the increasing duration of patent 
applications', CEB Working Paper 005 
van Zeebroeck N. (2010) 'The puzzle of patent value indicators', Economics of Innovation 
and New Technologies, in press 
van Zeebroeck N., N. Stevnsborg, B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, D. Guellec and E. 
Archontopoulos (2008) 'Patent inflation in Europe', World Patent Information, 30(1), 
43-52 
van Zeebroeck N., B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, and D. Guellec (2009) 'Claiming 
More: The increased voluminosity of patent applications and its determinants', Research 
Policy, 38(6), 1006-1020 
Weber Max (1924) Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Abriß der universalen Sozial- und 
irtschaftgeschichte. Aus den nachgelassenen Vorlesungen herausgegeben von S. 
Hellmann u. M. Palyi, 2nd edition, Munich, Duncker & Humblot; Chapter 4 
WIPO (2008a) World Patent Report – A statistical review, World Intellectual Property 
Organisation, 72 p 
WIPO (2008b) 'Standing Committee on the Law of Patents', Twelfth Session, Geneva, June 
23 to 27, pp. 137 
Yamauchi I. and S. Nagaoka (2009) 'Reforms of patent examination request system in 
Japan: some lessons', IIR Working Paper 
Yoshikawa, A. (1988) Japanese biotechnology: new drugs, industrial organisation, 
Innovation and strategic alliance, Berkeley Roundtable of the International Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
Appendix 1. Relevance of operational design components  
 
 
Tables A.1 and A.2 present a pair-wise comparison of all of the components of an 
operational design. A “1” means that the row component is more important (or relevant) 
for quality than the column component. The simple sum (last column) provides a 
weighting scheme for the relevance of each component. 
 
For the novelty legal standard, the most important components of operational design are 
controlled adaptability (8), the opposition process (7) and the difficulty of hiding patents 
(6). The components with low relevance are the grace period (0), the ownership rule (2) 
and the publication of a search report (2). 
 
 
Table A.1. Relevance scale for the operational design of the novelty legal standard 
  OD1 OD2 OD3 OD4 OD5 OD6 OD7 OD8 OD9 SUM 
OD2.1. Subject matters   1   1    1    3 
OD2.2. Ownership     1    1    2 
OD2.3. Identification of prior 
art  1  1      1    3 
OD2.4. Search report    1     1    2 
OD2.5. Language(s)  1 1 1 1     1     5 
OD2.6. Opposition process  1 1 1 1 1   1   1 7 
OD2.7. Grace period           0 
OD2.8. Controlled adaptability  1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 8 
OD2.9. No hidden patents  1 1 1 1 1   1     6 
 
 
For the inventiveness legal standard, the most important components of operational 
design are skills (6), the novelty test (4) and the low-workload patents (4). The 
components with low relevance are definition of inventiveness (0), the request for 
examination (2) and the opposition process (2). 
 
 
Table A.2. Relevance scale for the operational design of the inventiveness legal 
standard 
  OD1 OD2 OD3 OD4 OD5 OD6 OD7 SUM 
OD3.1. Novelty test    1 1 1     1 4 
OD3.2. Request of examination    1    1   2 
OD3.3. Def. of inventiveness         0 
OD3.4. Incentives   1  1    1   3 
OD3.5. Skills  1 1 1 1   1 1 6 
OD3.6. Low workload  1   1 1     1 4 
OD3.7. Opposition process   1  1      2 
 